

## The complaint

Mrs V complains Revolut Ltd didn't do enough to protect her when she fell victim to a job scam.

## What happened

Mrs V has an account with Revolut which she opened in the course of this scam. She has accounts with three other businesses too, who I'll refer to as "H", "W" and "M" throughout the rest of this decision.

Mrs V started a job on 1 September 2023 – having seen an opportunity online and having been contacted by someone claiming to be a recruiter. The job involved completing tasks online. Mrs V says she was shown how to do this and that in order to complete tasks she needed to buy cryptocurrency and send this to the platform she was working on. The whole opportunity was, in fact, a job scam and had all the common features of such scams.

Mrs V says she sent two £4,500 payments to a known cryptocurrency exchange from her account with Revolut on 8 September 2023 in connection with her "job". She says she tried to make more payments too but was at first told that they'd been declined because of a rolling weekly limit of £10,000 on payments to cryptocurrency and then because the payment was considered too risky. The payments and attempted payments were a mixture of card payments and transfers.

Mrs V says she realised she'd been scammed when one of the other businesses – M – intervened and questioned her and told her that she'd been scammed. That was on 17 September 2023. Mrs V contacted Revolut to say she'd been scammed and to ask for a refund. She contacted H, M and W too.

Revolut looked into Mrs V's claim and ultimately said that it wasn't going to refund her payments and wouldn't be able to recover her money using a chargeback. Mrs V was unhappy with Revolut's response and complained and came to us.

One of our investigators looked into Mrs V's complaint against Revolut and said that they thought that Revolut should have intervened when she tried to make both payments as they were identifiably to cryptocurrency and large enough to be of concern. Had Revolut done so, our investigator thought that Mrs V would have been honest and open about what she was doing and that her answers ought to have alerted Revolut to the hallmarks of a job scam. So, they recommended that Revolut refund both payments having deducted 50% to take account of contributory negligence.

Mrs V accepted our investigator's recommendations, including their recommendation regarding contributory negligence. Revolut didn't saying that this case involved "me to me" transfers and that it wasn't aware of any rationale explanation as to why it should be responsible for losses that occurred after such a transfer and that it had set out its position in detail when it sent us its file. Revolut asked for Mrs V's complaint to be referred to an ombudsman for a decision. All four of Mrs V's complaints were referred to decision as a result. All four complaints were passed to me.

## **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Everyone agrees that Mrs V has fallen victim to a job scam. She started this "job" on 1 September 2023 and things started to go wrong, as far as I can see, when she received her first earnings having worked five days in a row. Mrs V started receiving "combination tasks" at that stage which the scammers had already sold to her as a good thing saying that they were an opportunity to earn higher commission rates. And that the larger payments she had to make in order to take these tasks on – which she'd been told she'd ultimately get back – were, therefore, worth it. I can see that as a result of these "combination tasks", amongst other things, that Mrs V started making increasingly large payments towards the scam from 5 September 2023 and that she was soon sending payments of over £3,000 and ultimately payments of £10,000 from some of her accounts. In total, she sent over £80,000 to the scammers, including £9,000 which came from Revolut. This triggered multiple warnings across her various accounts and meant Mrs V not only had problems finding money to fund her payments but was also very concerned about how much she might lose.

Mrs V made two payments totalling £9,000 – in other words, two £4,500 payments – on 8 September 2023 from her account with Revolut to a cryptocurrency exchange. I'm satisfied that Revolut allowed both of Mrs V's payments to go through without intervening. She then attempted to make further payments the following day and week. I'm satisfied that all of those payments were blocked – at first because they took her over a £10,000 weekly rolling limit that Revolut had for cryptocurrency payments at that time, and subsequently because the payments were considered too risky.

I agree with our investigator that Revolut should have intervened when Mrs V tried to make both of her £4,500 payments as they were identifiably to cryptocurrency and large enough to be of concern. I accept that Revolut had no historical data for Mrs V to go on, but large amounts of money coming into a newly opened account then being sent to cryptocurrency – as was happening in Mrs V's case – are the signs of someone being scammed and the types of signs that Revolut ought to have been aware of at the time. Had Revolut intervened appropriately – for example, using a better automated warning – I agree that Mrs V would have been honest and open about what she was doing and that her answers ought to have alerted Revolut to the hallmarks of a job scam. I say that having seen her response when some of the other businesses intervened and, in particular, the interventions of M which is what ultimately led Mrs V to realise that she'd been scammed. I've listened, in particular, to calls between Mrs V and M. More importantly, had Revolut intervened, and done so successfully, I'm satisfied that Mrs V would have realised that she was falling victim to a scam and wouldn't have made any further payments. So, Revolut should refund Mrs V both of the £4,500 payments she made as it missed an opportunity to prevent harm here.

Our investigator recommended that liability be shared between Revolut and Mrs V on the basis of contributory negligence. In cases where we apply a deduction for contributory negligence, our starting point is a 50% deduction. In this case, our investigator recommended a 50% deduction when it came to Revolut – a recommendation Mrs V accepted. I agree that liability should be shared equally in this instance as I can see that Mrs V did have concerns early on that she didn't act on and that there were a lot of red flags that she ignored. So, I'm also going to apply a 50% deduction.

## **Putting things right**

Based on what I've just said, I'm going to require Revolut to refund 50% of the payments she made on 8 September 2023 together with 8% simple interest from the date of payment to the

date of settlement.

**My final decision**

My final decision is that I require Revolut Ltd to refund 50% of the payments she made on 8 September 2023 together with 8% simple interest from the date of payment to the date of settlement.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs V to accept or reject my decision before 11 November 2024.

Nicolas Atkinson  
**Ombudsman**