DRN-4742494

Financial Ombudsman Service

The complaint

Mr D complains that Carey Pensions UK LLP ('Carey') (now called Options UK Personal Pensions LLP, but I'll refer to Carey throughout for ease) failed to carry out sufficient due diligence on the investments made within his Self-Invested Personal Pension ('SIPP').

What happened

In December 2011, Mr D says he was advised by a business I'll refer to as 'ILAWS' to transfer his existing pension to a Carey SIPP and make an investment in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits.

Global Forestry was an investment in a leasehold plot of a Teak tree plantation in Brazil run by GFI Consultants Ltd ('GFI'). The investment aim was for a positive return generated through the development of Teak trees. Mr D's specific investment was the 'Belem Sky Plantation Project'.

The Carbon Credits were sold by the Carbon Advice Group Limited ('CAG'). A carbon credit is a generic term for any tradable certificate or permit representing the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide or the mass of another greenhouse gas with a carbon dioxide equivalent (tC02e) equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide.

ILAWS was not regulated by the Financial Services Authority ('FSA', now the Financial Conduct Authority – 'FCA'). The Director of ILAWS, someone I'll refer to as 'Mr M', submitted the paperwork to Carey; Mr M had previously been the Director of two firms that provided mortgage advice. However, Mr M was not regulated in any capacity when he submitted Mr D's SIPP application to Carey.

The application form for the Carey SIPP was signed by Mr D on 15 December 2011 and detailed that he wanted to transfer a personal pension plan into the SIPP which had a value of approximately £46,000. In the Investments section, it was stated that Mr D wanted to invest £30,000 in Global Forestry and around £13,000 in CAG.

In the Financial Adviser Details section, the details of a business I'll refer to as 'Firm E' were given. According to the FCA's register, Firm E was an appointed representative of another firm and that firm's FSA register number was given. But the contact details given in the application form were all those of ILAWS, including the contact email address, phone number and postal address. No advice fees were to be paid to Firm E.

The declaration Mr D signed confirmed, amongst other things, that:

- He agreed to indemnify Carey Pensions UK LLP 'The Administrator' and Carey Pension Trustees UK Ltd against any claim in respect of any decision made by himself/or his financial adviser/Investment Manager or any other professional adviser he chose to appoint from time to time;
- He understood that Carey Pensions UK LLP and Carey Pension Trustees UK Ltd were not in any way able to provide him with any advice;
- He was establishing the Carey Pension Scheme on an execution only basis.

Carey wrote to Mr D confirming his SIPP had been established on 22 December 2011 and provided him with the SIPP terms and conditions, key features and fee schedule.

On 6 February 2012, ILAWS wrote to Carey enclosing a letter of authority from Mr D addressed to his existing pension provider.

In February 2012, around £47,000 was received into Mr D's SIPP from his existing personal pension plan. Following receipt of the funds, Carey emailed Mr M of ILAWS about how the funds should be invested as paperwork completed previously had been shredded due to the delay. Mr M responded on 27 February 2012, explaining the split of the investments in Global Forestry and CAG. Mr M said he would, "*arrange to get member declarations this week.*"

Mr D signed an alternative investment declaration and indemnity form for the Carbon Credits investment on 3 March 2012, declaring, amongst other things, that:

- He instructed Carey to open an account with CAG to purchase and sell Carbon Credits for a consideration of £13,980.
- He was fully aware the investment was an 'Alternative Investment' and may be considered high risk and/or speculative.
- Carey was acting on an execution only basis and hadn't provided any advice.
- He'd read the Terms of Business for CAG and had taken appropriate advice.
- He confirmed his normal day to day business was not that of trading Carbon Credits.
- He confirmed that because of potential liquidity issues, Carey Pensions UK LLP had suggested a range of 0-50% of his fund to be invested in this investment but that the decision of the amount invested rested with him and his advisers and they had made the decision of the amount to invest, as noted above.
- He didn't hold Carey responsible for any exchange rate or market rate fluctuations that might adversely affect the value of the investment.
- Should the investment be subject to a tax charge within the scheme this would be paid directly from his fund or by him.
- He indemnified Carey against any and all liability arising from this investment.

The form was counter-signed by Mr M of ILAWS as 'witness'.

Mr D signed an alternative investment declaration and indemnity form for the Global Forestry investment on 3 March 2012 declaring, amongst other things, that:

- He instructed Carey to purchase a leasehold plot of land through Global Forestry Investments for a consideration of £30,000.
- He was fully aware the investment was an 'Alternative Investment' and may be considered high risk and/or speculative.
- Carey was acting on an execution only basis and hadn't provided any advice.
- He'd read and discussed the adviser notification letter with his financial adviser and wanted to proceed.
- He didn't hold Carey responsible for any exchange rate fluctuations that might adversely affect the value of the investment.
- Should the investment be subject to a tax charge within the scheme this would be paid directly from his fund or by him.
- He indemnified Carey against any and all liability arising from or in connection with the investment.

The form was counter-signed by Mr M of ILAWS as 'witness'.

On 6 March 2012, Carey sent GFI Mr D's signed Global Forestry SIPP investment agreement and SIPP rental agreement.

Mr D invested £30,000 of his pension monies in Global Forestry on 8 March 2012, paying an administration fee to GFI of £750, and £13,980 in Carbon Credits on 14 March 2012.

On 14 March 2012, CAG provided Carey with a signed copy of the Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement ('ERPA'). The ERPA had been signed by Carey on 12 March 2012 and counter-signed by CAG on 14 March 2012. It confirmed Mr D had purchased 1,165 Certified Emission Reduction Carbon Credits ('CERs') with a unit price of £12 for a total consideration of £13,980.

On 26 March 2012 Carey provided Mr D with confirmation of his investment in CAG and enclosed the Transfer Certificate for the CERs.

In May 2012, GFI provided confirmation of Mr D's investment in Global Forestry.

Carey wrote to Mr D in August 2013 about the delay in the Global Forestry income being paid into his SIPP. And in November 2013 Carey informed Mr D that it had been told the income payments due from the Global Forestry investment for 2013 and 2014 would be paid into his pension in January 2014 with a 2% bonus.

Carey wrote to Mr D on 14 April 2014 to tell him that the income he was expecting from the Global Forestry investment in 2013 and 2014 had not been paid.

In July 2014, a financial adviser, instructed by Mr D, wrote to Carey asking for information about his pension, including the status of the investments.

In 2014, Global Forestry Investment went into administration. And, in 2015, the Serious Fraud Office ('SFO') announced it had opened an investigation into it. In 2019, the SFO said that former directors of GFI had been charged with offences relating to alleged fraud concerning Global Forestry between August 2010 to December 2015. But that it couldn't provide any further comment while the investigation continued. And, in 2022, the Directors were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud and misconduct in the course of winding up. The SFO noted an intricate web of money transfers, forged documents and investment identities used to scan pensioners and savers out of their money under the false pretence of environmental protection.

In December 2014, Mr D's annual SIPP statement showed the Global Forestry investment had been valued at nil. In the covering letter, Carey said:

"Your holding in Global Forestry Investments has been valued at nil on your Annual Valuation as we have not received the income due for 2013 and 2014 and we have been unable to contact the company to verify the position of your holding. We will continue to monitor the situation and will keep you informed of any updates we receive."

Carey wrote to Mr D in September 2015 about his Carbon Credits investment. It said it had contacted a number of Carbon Credit brokers, who had all confirmed there were no prices for them; it understood this to mean there was no market for selling Carbon Credits. As such, it had valued his investment at nil, which reflected the current market conditions. Carey provided Mr D with a link to a website where he could find further details of the project his Carbon Credits had funded. It also reiterated Carey was not permitted to give advice and said he may wish to seek independent financial advice for guidance on his options going

forwards. It noted Mr D didn't have a financial adviser attached to his SIPP and provided some websites where he could find one in his area.

Mr D's December 2015 annual SIPP statement showed both of his investments were valued at nil. In the covering letter, Carey said:

"Please be aware that unfortunately we have valued your holding in Global Forestry Investments at nil for the purposes of your Annual Valuation. This is because the investment is currently in liquidation. The liquidator is in the process of verifying whether there are any assets that can be sold in order to be able to make a distribution to you as a creditor. The liquidator is required to provide an annual report to all creditors. The next report is due in May 2016 and we are not expecting to receive any further communication from them until then. We are unable to confirm how long the liquidation will take however, we will provide you with all information that is provided to us by the liquidator."

Mr D received an email from Carey in May 2016 in which it attached the liquidator of GFI's annual report. The email explained the Directors of GFI were being investigated by the SFO.

In January 2019 Mr D's representative made a complaint on his behalf to Carey. The complaint letter referred to Mr D having been advised by ILAWS, an unregulated firm, to open a SIPP with Carey. Although it noted another advisory firm, 'Firm E' was referenced on Mr D's SIPP application form, Mr D's representative said that Carey sent its acknowledgment of the application to individuals at ILAWS, including a 'Mr M' and that it went on to accept investment instructions from Mr M.

Mr D's representative said Mr D's only pension, valued at around £47,000, was transferred into the SIPP and the funds were then invested in Global Forestry and a scheme purchasing Carbon Credits. It said neither investment was suitable for Mr D, who had no investment experience. It said Carey required Mr D to sign indemnities confirming he'd received advice, which it ought to have known hadn't been provided. It said Carey should not have accepted introductions from ILAWS as it wasn't regulated but was receiving commission payments from the investment schemes. It said if Carey had been acting in Mr D's best interests in line with the Regulator's Principles for Business it wouldn't have accepted Mr D's SIPP application or permitted the investments.

In February 2019, Carey sent Mr D its final response letter. It said, in summary, that:

- It received a SIPP application form and instruction from Mr D to invest the proceeds of his personal pension plan in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits. Mr D had appointed a financial adviser so Carey treated him as a client who had received advice on the investments.
- Mr D was informed that GFI had gone into liquidation and Mr D had raised a concern via telephone on 2 November 2014 – Mr D was very unhappy and demanded to know where his funds were.
- In December 2014 he was informed that the Global Forestry investment had been valued at nil.
- In September 2015 Mr D was informed his Carbon Credits investment was also valued at nil, with his December 2015 statement showing both investments held no value.
- Mr D was aware of the problems with his investment since September 2014. As such, his complaint was time-barred as it wasn't made until January 2019, which more than three years later from the date he was aware of his cause for complaint.
- Mr D raised concerns in January 2016, which Carey responded to.
- In light of the above, Mr D's complaint was time-barred as he had complained more

than six years after the event he'd complained of and more than three years after he ought reasonably to have been aware of his cause for complaint.

Mr D's representative responded, saying Mr D acknowledged he was very unhappy with the way Carey had invested his pension and that he'd had phone calls expressing his dismay that the investments had failed. But it said Mr D wasn't aware of Carey's obligations to him under the Principles until he'd appointed his representative in 2018.

Carey sent Mr D an additional response in which it maintained the complaint was time-barred. But it added that it had carried out due diligence checks on each of the investments to ensure they could be held in the SIPP and that the reviews didn't highlight anything that gave it cause for concern. Carey also said it took steps to ensure Mr D was aware of the high risk and speculative nature of the investments. It said it guided Mr D to take financial advice but this was ultimately his choice. Finally, Carey said Mr D made an informed decision to proceed and it actioned his instructions as required of it, as an execution only business, in line with its obligations under COBS 11.2.19.

Mr D referred his complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service in May 2019.

Carey provided its file but maintained Mr D's complaint was time-barred. Our Investigator thought the complaint had been made in time, but as Carey disagreed, the complaint was referred to an Ombudsman to decide whether or not Mr D's complaint was made in time.

An Ombudsman determined Mr D's complaint had been made in time. Although he noted Mr D was aware of problems with his pension investments since late 2014, he wasn't satisfied that Mr D could've reasonably considered Carey had any responsibility for the position he was in. So, the Ombudsman wasn't persuaded that Mr D was aware of his cause for complaint about Carey until he approached his representative in 2018, and he'd complained within three years of this date.

Our Investigator asked Carey a series of detailed questions in respect of the due diligence it had carried out on ILAWS, CAG and the Global Forestry investment and for evidence of this. Carey provided extensive information, which I will set out and refer to later on in this decision.

Mr D was asked for his recollections of the interactions he had with ILAWS and Firm E. Mr D told us the following:

- He first met Mr M of ILAWS at a social event, where Mr M explained he was involved with pensions and would be able to help Mr D achieve better results with his pension than he was currently getting.
- He met Mr M again in a café, where Mr M had paperwork ready for Mr D to sign in order to transfer his existing pension.
- Mr D believed Mr M was providing him with advice to transfer his pension and make the investment. Mr D says he was told the investments were 'low risk' and that Mr M had also invested in the schemes.
- He had no knowledge of Firm E – he hadn't met or spoken with any representative of that firm. When Mr D saw Firm E's involvement he asked who they were and was told "it's just something we have to do".
- Mr D had always invested in low-risk funds as this was his only pension and was very important to him.
- Mr D feels embarrassed about matters and feels he was duped by Mr M, who appeared to be a very plausible salesperson.

The Investigator went on to uphold Mr D's complaint on the grounds that Carey didn't carry out sufficient due diligence checks on the investment in Global Forestry, in line with the Principles and industry guidance. Had it done so, the Investigator thought Carey would've identified a number of red flags in respect of the Global Forestry investment that posed a significant risk of consumer detriment. In particular the investment literature said there was a guaranteed minimum 10% return but it wasn't clear how that could be generated.

The Investigator also didn't think Carey had carried out sufficient due diligence checks on the Carbon Credits investment. She thought Carey ought to have known that the FSA had issued a consumer warning in relation to carbon credit trading on 3 August 2011. This said:

"Whilst not all carbon credit trading schemes are a scam, it is often not made clear to investors that trading on these markets requires skill and experience. You may lose money on your investment by not being able to sell, or at least geta competitive rate, when trading a small volume of carbon credits."

Mr D's contract was for CER carbon credits and the Investigator said this market was unregulated and the credits weren't traded on regulated exchanges. So, Carey ought to have identified that it wasn't clear there was - or ever would be - a market for the carbon credits Mr D was buying, meaning he might have struggled to realise the investment when he wanted to take benefits from his pension or make changes to it.

Overall, the Investigator said Carey ought to have known that both investments posed a high risk of consumer detriment and that having Mr D sign indemnity declarations wasn't an effective way for Carey to meet its obligations. It should have refused Mr D's business instead. And if it had done this and shared its concerns with Mr D then it's unlikely the investment would have gone ahead. So she said Carey should put this right by compensating Mr D for his loss based on him having remained in his existing schemes. She also said that Carey should pay Mr D £300 compensation for the distress and inconvenience this matter has caused him.

Carey didn't respond to the Investigator's view on this complaint. But in other complaints referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service where customers invested in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits through Carey SIPPS, it said, amongst other things, that:

- Our Service has failed to take account of relevant law and regulations, as required by DISP or to set out whether and (if so) the basis upon which it is appropriate to depart from the relevant law. The duties suggested would not be recognised in a court and legal liability would not be established.
- Only the SIPP guidance published prior to receiving the customer's SIPP application and subsequent investment instructions is relevant. Otherwise our Service would be considering complaints with the benefit of hindsight, which no reasonable court would do. The later guidance introduced new expectations and reflected more than what the industry was already doing.
- Reference to the Reviews contravene the decisions in *Adams v Options SIPP* [2020] EWHC 1229 (Ch) and *Adams v Options UK Personal Pensions LLP* [2021] EWCA Civ 474 on the basis these:
  - have no bearing on the construction of the Principles as the contents of the documents cannot found a claim for compensation in themselves;
  - cannot alter the meaning of, or the scope of the obligations imposed by, the Principles;
  - do not provide "*guidance*" and even if they were considered statutory guidance made under Financial Services and Markets Act ('FSMA') s.139A, any breach would not give rise to a claim for damages under FSMA s.138D.

- The FCA's Enforcement Guide says that "*Guidance is not binding on those to whom the FCA's rules apply. Nor are the variety of materials (such as case studies showing good or bad practice, FCA speeches and generic letters written by the FCA to Chief Executives in particular sectors) published to support the rules and guidance in the Handbook. Rather, such materials are intended to illustrate ways (but not the only ways) in which a person can comply with the relevant rules.*"
- Carey had a very limited legal obligation to undertake due diligence in respect of the investments. The judge in *Adams* refused to recognise a due diligence duty, instead concluding that obligations are framed by reference to the context of the contractual relationship.
- Our Service is imposing an obligation on it to undertake a qualitative assessment of the investments and to pass this on, effectively amounting to a recommendation to customers not to proceed, which overreaches its legal obligations and goes further than published regulatory material.
- The fact an investment is speculative doesn't preclude it from being held within a SIPP. The extent to which an investment may be speculative might impact on the suitability for the investor. But Carey wasn't permitted to advise, or even comment, on that.
- Expecting Carey to refuse the business and share with customers why would have required it to provide advice to them.
- We've said that had it carried out more due diligence it would have discovered the investment monies were being paid into personal accounts of GFI directors, but this is with the benefit of hindsight with no evidence this information was readily available at the time. The SFO didn't in fact discover this until 2015. And, in any event, the extent of its due diligence obligations were limited to establishing the investment wouldn't give risk to tax liabilities in accordance with HMRC guidelines.
- And while GFI was first registered with Companies House in April 2010, evidence shows it had been operating since 2008.
- Carey would not have been able to identify that Global Forestry was a scam based on the evidence available to it at the time.
- There is no prohibition on the acceptance of high-risk investments into a SIPP – the very purpose of a SIPP is to provide greater investment control and flexibility, which is often deliberately exercised by members in order to gain access to higher-risk investments.
- It was made clear to customers in the application that the investments were "high risk and speculative".
- It didn't cause the customer's loss and it's likely they would have proceeded with the investments and would've found a way to invest regardless.
- Our Service has effectively said that no SIPP provider complying with its obligations could properly have accepted the investments, even if the customer had been sophisticated and fully informed, despite the investment presenting as legitimate. But that isn't logical and isn't supported by the evidence. Customers could have asked it or another SIPP provider to proceed in any case.
- Carey's contract with customers relieves it of liability. To conclude otherwise would render it void and unenforceable.
- It isn't fair or reasonable for it to have to bear the loss where the investment simply didn't perform as hoped or expected or when it transpired to be a scam in circumstances it couldn't have predicted or reasonably foreseen.
- It would be manifestly unfair to hold Carey responsible for the loss given the customer accepted the risks of making the investment. The customer must bear some responsibility for his decision to invest.
- The execution only SIPP market provides autonomy, and if it is to be held liable for poor investment choices this will severely impact the market, depriving customers of the low-cost route.

- There is real unfairness if an execution-only SIPP provider is liable for poor investment choices of consumers or investments that turn out to be scams given its business is structured on the basis that it isn't investigating the quality of the investment and its fees and charges are based on that approach.

Additional background information

I'm aware that in submissions on other cases with our Service involving SIPP due diligence Carey has also said, amongst other things, that:

- As an execution only business, Carey would have been in breach of the Conduct of Business Sourcebook ('COBS') 11.2.19 had it not followed the signed instructions given to it. COBS 11.2.19R, which deals with execution only business and was in force at the relevant time, stated as follows:

  "*Whenever there is a specific instruction from the client, the firm must execute the order following the specific instruction.*

  A firm satisfies its obligation under this section to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for a client to the extent that it executes an order, or a specific aspect of an order, following specific instructions from the client relating to the order or the specific aspect of the order."

- Carey did not suggest or recommend the investments. It is not responsible for the performance or current market value of these. The mere underperformance of an investment does not create a wrong or liability.
- Our Service is holding it to a standard which is unclear and is on any view much more demanding than is fair or reasonable.
- We haven't set out where we have departed from the law, and why we have taken that approach.
- Our Service has failed to apply the settled legal principles of causation and contributory negligence in circumstances where it is clear that a customer was determined to proceed with the investment regardless of whether or not Carey accepted the applications.
- Our Service is seeking to impose on Carey a duty of due diligence, in particular a duty to decide whether to accept or reject particular investments and/or referrals of business. However, our construction of the Principles is flawed, it is neither fair nor reasonable to determine the complaint by reference to the regulatory publications mentioned, and Carey was not under the duty of due diligence that we seek to impose.
- As made clear in *Adams*, reports, guidance and correspondence issued after the events at issue cannot be applied to Carey's conduct at the time. In any event, the regulatory publications of the type referred to cannot found a claim for compensation in themselves and do not assist in construction of the Principles.
- It would be neither fair nor reasonable for me to determine the complaint by reference to the FCA publications and to do so would only exacerbate the problem referred to in *R (on the application of Aviva Life and Pensions (UK) Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2017].
- Contrary to COBS, the Financial Ombudsman Service seeks to impose on Carey a duty of due diligence that it does not in fact owe. It seeks, in effect, to override COBS' careful allocation of duties between different types of firms conducting different types of business, and to impose duties on Carey in addition to those provided for under COBS, by means of a generalised appeal to the Principles.
- If under the Principles Carey really had the obligations of due diligence we have set

out, and had acted in accordance with them, it would have been required to engage in the activity of advising on investments, and so place itself in contravention of its regulatory permissions. Hence the importance of the contractual documentation governing the arrangements between the parties considered below.

- The relationships are the same as in *Adams* which held that:
  - To identify the extent of the regulatory duties imposed on Carey, "*one has to identify the relevant factual context*" and that "*the key fact… in the context is the agreement into which the parties entered, which defined their roles in the transaction*"
  - "*there is a very plain inconsistency between the contract which was entered into between it and the claimant and the duties* [under COBS 2.1.1R] *which the claimant now suggests that the defendant owed to him*";
  - "*there was*… [no] *duty on* [Carey]… *to consider the suitability of appropriateness of a SIPP or the underlying investment. The contract between* [the parties] *makes that clear*"; and
  - "*a duty to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of the client, who is to take responsibility for his own decisions, cannot be construed… as meaning that the terms of the contract should be overlooked, that the client is not to be treated as able to reach and take responsibility for his own decisions and that his instructions are not to be followed*".

- The Financial Ombudsman Service has ignored, or placed insufficient weight on, the fundamental fact of the parties' contractual arrangements, and on the clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities thereunder, and consequently to have constructed due diligence obligations for Carey to which it was not in fact subject.
- Our Service only acknowledges our divergence from *Adams* in passing, and the brief justifications for it are misconceived.
- The judge's conclusion in *Adams* is avoided through the finding that, regardless of the relevant contractual arrangements, Carey should have concluded that the investment was inappropriate and refused to accept the application. Again, however, this is to misapprehend the relationship between the Principles and Carey's contractual arrangements. The latter, as set out in *Adams*, reflect the legal basis upon which Carey – like other similar firms – conducted its business: the concept of execution-only services is well known in the financial services context, as is reflected in the case law, one of the reasons clients seek the services of execution-only SIPP providers being that they do not wish to pay the higher charges of advisory pension providers. To seek to use the Principles, notwithstanding this factual context, to impose on Carey the duties of due diligence set out in the decision, is both artificial and illegitimate.
- Carey's duties extended no further than those owed to the claimant in *Adams* and, accordingly, it is neither reasonable nor fair for Carey to pay compensation.
- In *Adams* the judge held that, in construing Carey's regulatory obligations, regard should be had to the consumer protection objective in FSMA s.5(2)(d) that the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. And that those decisions, as between the claimant and the defendant, are set out in the documents which comprise the contract between them.
- The FCA did not disagree with this approach. The Principles reflect the statutory objective. And those statutory objectives include the consumer protection objective: see *Kerrigan v Elevate Credit International Limited*.
- Our Service has failed to have regard to FSMA s.5(2)(d), and to the authority of *Adams* and *Kerrigan* in this respect.

As Carey didn't respond to the Investigator's view, the case was passed to me for a decision.

I issued a provisional decision on 14 March 2024. I said that Carey had failed to carry out adequate due diligence on the Carbon Credits and the Global Forestry investments. And I thought if Carey had done so, it should've refused to permit the investments to be held in its SIPPs. And it was fair and reasonable to conclude that if Carey had refused to permit the Carbon Credits and Global Forestry investments in its SIPPs then Mr D would've retained his existing pension and wouldn't have switched it to a SIPP or subsequently made the investments that he did. So I recommended that Carey should put Mr D back in the position he would have been in if he hadn't transferred his pension to the Carey SIPP. I also recommended that it pay him £500 for the distress and inconvenience caused by the total loss of his pension.

Mr D accepted my provisional decision. Carey did not respond to my provisional decision by the deadline I gave. So, I'm now proceeding with my final decision.

What I've decided – and why

Jurisdiction

An Ombudsman determined that Mr D had made his complaint in time and following this, Carey provided its file for the Investigator to consider. So, as Carey hasn't disputed our jurisdiction to consider the complaint, I haven't considered the matter any further.

Merits of the complaint

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Given that Mr D accepted my provisional decision and Carey didn't provide a response, I see no reason to depart from my provisional findings. As such, I've decided to uphold Mr D's complaint and I've largely repeated my findings, as per my provisional decision, below.

When considering what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances, I need to take account of relevant law and regulations, regulator's rules, guidance and standards, codes of practice and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

In deciding what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances, it's appropriate to take an inquisitorial approach. And, ultimately, what I'll be looking at here is whether Carey took reasonable care, acted with due diligence and treated Mr D fairly, in accordance with his best interests. And what I think is fair and reasonable in light of that. And I think the key issue in Mr D's complaint is whether it was fair and reasonable for Carey to have accepted Mr D's SIPP business in the first place.

Relevant considerations

I think the FCA's Principles for Businesses – which are set out in the FCA's Handbook – are of particular relevance. These "*are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of firms under the regulatory system*" (PRIN 1.1.2G – at the relevant date). And Principles 2, 3 and 6 provide:

"*Principle 2 – Skill, care and diligence – A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence.*"

Principle 3 – Management and control – A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.

Principle 6 – Customers' interests – A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly."

I've carefully considered the relevant law and what this says about the application of the FCA's Principles. In *R (British Bankers Association) v Financial Services Authority* [2011] EWHC 999 (Admin) ('*BBA*') Ouseley J said at paragraph 162:

"*The Principles are best understood as the ever present substrata to which the specific rules are added. The Principles always have to be complied with. The Specific rules do not supplant them and cannot be used to contradict them. They are but specific applications of them to the particular requirements they cover. The general notion that the specific rules can exhaust the application of the Principles is inappropriate. It cannot be an error of law for the Principles to augment specific rules.*"

And at paragraph 77 of BBA Ouseley J said:

"*Indeed, it is my view that it would be a breach of statutory duty for the Ombudsman to reach a view on a case without taking the Principles into account in deciding what would be fair and reasonable and what redress to afford. Even if no Principles had been produced by the FSA, the FOS would find it hard to fulfil its particular statutory duty without having regard to the sort of high level Principles which find expression in the Principles, whoever formulated them. They are of the essence of what is fair and reasonable, subject to the argument about their relationship to specific rules*."

In *R (Berkeley Burke SIPP Administration Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2018] EWHC 2878) ('*BBSAL*'), Berkeley Burke brought a judicial review claim challenging the decision of an Ombudsman who had upheld a consumer's complaint against it. The Ombudsman considered the FCA Principles and good industry practice at the relevant time. He concluded that it was fair and reasonable for Berkeley Burke to have undertaken due diligence in respect of the investment before allowing it into the SIPP wrapper, and that if it had done so, it would have refused to accept the investment. The Ombudsman found Berkeley Burke had therefore not complied with its regulatory obligations and hadn't treated its client fairly.

Jacobs J, having set out some paragraphs of *BBA* including paragraph 162 set out above, said (at paragraph 104 of *BBSAL*):

"*These passages explain the overarching nature of the Principles. As the FCA correctly submitted in their written argument, the role of the Principles is not merely to cater for new or unforeseen circumstances. The judgment in BBA shows that they are, and indeed were always intended to be, of general application. The aim of the Principles-based regulation described by Ouseley J. was precisely not to attempt to formulate a code covering all possible circumstances, but instead to impose general duties such as those set out in Principles 2 and 6.*"

The *BBSAL* judgment also considers s.228 of the FSMA and the approach an Ombudsman is to take when deciding a complaint. The judgment of Jacobs J in BBSAL upheld the lawfulness of the approach taken by the Ombudsman in that complaint, which I've described above, and included the Principles and good industry practice at the relevant time as relevant considerations that were required to be taken into account.

As outlined above, Ouseley J in the *BBA* case held that it would be a breach of statutory duty if I were to reach a decision on a complaint without taking the Principles into account in deciding what's fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of a case. And Jacobs J adopted a similar approach to the application of the Principles in *BBSAL*. I'm therefore satisfied that the Principles are a relevant consideration that I must take into account when deciding this complaint.

On 18 May 2020, the High Court handed down its judgment in the case of *Adams v Options SIPP* [2020] EWHC 1229 (Ch). Mr Adams subsequently appealed the decision of the High Court and, on 1 April 2021, the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in *Adams v Options UK Personal Pensions LLP* [2021] EWCA Civ 474. I've taken account of both judgments when making this decision on Mr D's case.

I note that the Principles for Businesses didn't form part of Mr Adams' pleadings in his initial case against Options SIPP. And, HHJ Dight didn't consider the application of the Principles to SIPP operators in his judgment. The Court of Appeal also gave no consideration to the application of the Principles to SIPP operators. So, neither judgment said anything about how the Principles apply to an Ombudsman's consideration of a complaint. But, to be clear, I don't say this means *Adams* isn't a relevant consideration at all. As noted above, I've taken account of both judgments when making this decision on Mr D's case.

I acknowledge that COBS 2.1.1R (*A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client*) overlaps with certain of the Principles, and that this rule was considered by HHJ Dight in the High Court case. Mr Adams pleaded that Options owed him a duty to comply with COBS 2.1.1R, a breach of which, he argued, was actionable pursuant to section 138(D) of FSMA ('the COBS claim'). HHJ Dight rejected this claim and found that Options had complied with the best interests rule on the facts of Mr Adams' case.

The Court of Appeal rejected Mr Adams' appeal against HHJ Dight's dismissal of the COBS claim, on the basis he was seeking to advance a case that was radically different to that found in his initial pleadings. The Court found that this part of Mr Adams' appeal didn't so much represent a challenge to the grounds on which HHJ Dight had dismissed the COBS claim, but rather was an attempt to put forward an entirely new case.

I note that in *Adams v Options SIPP*, HHJ Dight found that the factual context of a case would inform the extent of the duty imposed by COBS 2.1.1R. HHJ Dight said at paragraph 148:

"*In my judgment in order to identify the extent of the duty imposed by Rule 2.1.1 one has to identify the relevant factual context, because it is apparent from the submissions of each of the parties that the context has an impact on the ascertainment of the extent of the duty. The key fact, perhaps composite fact, in the context is the agreement into which the parties entered, which defined their roles and functions in the transaction.*"

I note there are significant differences between the breaches of COBS 2.1.1R alleged by Mr Adams (summarised in paragraph 120 of the Court of Appeal judgment) and the issues in Mr D's complaint. In particular, HHJ Dight considered the contractual relationship between the parties in the context of Mr Adams' pleaded breaches of COBS 2.1.1R that happened after the contract was entered into. And he wasn't asked to consider the question of due diligence before Options SIPP agreed to accept the investment into its SIPP.

In Mr D's complaint, amongst other things, I'm considering whether Carey ought to have identified that the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments involved a significant risk

of consumer detriment. And, if so, whether it ought to have declined to accept Mr D's application.

The facts of Mr Adams' and Mr D's cases are also different. I make that point to highlight that there are factual differences between *Adams v Options SIPP* and Mr D's case. And I need to construe the duties Carey owed to Mr D under COBS 2.1.1R in light of the specific facts of his case.

So, I'm satisfied that COBS 2.1.1R is a relevant consideration – but that it needs to be considered alongside the remainder of the relevant considerations, and within the factual context of Mr D's case.

However, it's important to emphasise that I must determine this complaint by reference to what I think is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. And, in doing that, I'm required to take into account relevant considerations which include: law and regulations; regulator's rules, guidance and standards; codes of practice; and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. There is a clear and relevant point of difference between this complaint and the judgments in *Adams v Options SIPP*. That was a legal claim which was defined by the formal pleadings in Mr Adams' statement of case.

I also want to emphasise that I don't say that Carey was under any obligation to advise Mr D on the SIPP and/or the underlying investments. Refusing to accept an application isn't the same thing as advising Mr D on the merits of the SIPP and/or the underlying investments. But I am satisfied Carey's obligations included deciding whether to accept particular investments into its SIPP. And I don't accept that it couldn't make such an assessment without straying into giving the member advice.

<u>The regulatory publications</u>

The FCA (and its predecessor, the FSA) issued a number of publications which reminded SIPP operators of their obligations and which set out how they might achieve the outcomes envisaged by the Principles, namely:

- The 2009 and 2012 Thematic Review reports.
- The October 2013 Finalised SIPP Operator Guidance.
- The July 2014 "*Dear CEO*" letter.

I've considered the relevance of these publications. And I've set out material parts of the publications here, although I've considered them in their entirety.

The 2009 Thematic Review Report

The 2009 report included the following statement:

"*We are very clear that SIPP operators, regardless of whether they provide advice, are bound by Principle 6 of the Principles for Businesses ('a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its clients and treat them fairly') insofar as they are obliged to ensure the fair treatment of their customers. COBS 3.2.3(2) states that a member of a pension scheme is a 'client' for COBS purposes, and 'Customer' in terms of Principle 6 includes clients.*

It is the responsibility of SIPP operators to continuously analyse the individual risks to themselves and their clients, with reference to the six TCF consumer outcomes.
…

We agree that firms acting purely as SIPP operators are not responsible for the SIPP advice given by third parties such as IFAs. However, we are also clear that SIPP operators cannot absolve themselves of any responsibility, and we would expect them to have procedures and controls, and to be gathering and analysing management information, enabling them to identify possible instances of financial crime and consumer detriment such as unsuitable SIPPs. Such instances could then be addressed in an appropriate way, for example by contacting the members to confirm the position, or by contacting the firm giving advice and asking for clarification. Moreover, while they are not responsible for the advice, there is a reputational risk to SIPP operators that facilitate SIPPs that are unsuitable or detrimental to clients.

Of particular concern were firms whose systems and controls were weak and inadequate to the extent that they had not identified obvious potential instances of poor advice and/or potential financial crime. Depending on the facts and circumstances of individual cases, we may take enforcement action against SIPP operators who do not safeguard their customers' interests in this respect, with reference to Principle 3 of the Principles for Businesses ('a firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems').

The following are examples of measures that SIPP operators could consider, taken from examples of good practice that we observed and suggestions we have made to firms:

- *Confirming, both initially and on an ongoing basis, that intermediaries that advise clients are authorised and regulated by the FSA, that they have the appropriate permissions to give the advice they are providing to the firm's clients, and that they do not appear on the FSA website listing warning notices.*

- *Having Terms of Business agreements governing relationships, and clarifying respective responsibilities, with intermediaries introducing SIPP business.*

- *Routinely recording and reviewing the type (i.e. the nature of the SIPP investment) and size of investments recommended by intermediaries that give advice and introduce clients to the firm, so that potentially unsuitable SIPPs can be identified.*

- *Being able to identify anomalous investments, e.g. unusually small or large transactions or more 'esoteric' investments such as unquoted shares, together with the intermediary that introduced the business. This would enable the firm to seek appropriate clarification, e.g. from the client or their adviser, if it is concerned about the suitability of what was recommended.*

- *Requesting copies of the suitability reports provided to clients by the intermediary giving advice. While SIPP operators are not responsible for advice, having this information would enhance the firm's understanding of its clients, making the facilitation of unsuitable SIPPs less likely.*

- *Routinely identifying instances of execution-only clients who have signed disclaimers taking responsibility for their investment decisions, and gathering and analysing data regarding the aggregate volume of such business.*

- *Identifying instances of clients waiving their cancellation rights, and the reasons for this".*

The later publications

In the October 2013 Finalised SIPP Operator Guidance, the FCA stated:

"This guide, originally published in September 2009, has been updated to give firms further guidance to help meet the regulatory requirements. These are not new or amended requirements, but a reminder of regulatory responsibilities that became a requirement in April 2007.
All firms, regardless of whether they do or do not provide advice must meet Principle 6 and treat customers fairly. COBS 3.2.3(2) is clear that a member of a pension scheme is a 'client' for SIPP operators and so is a customer under Principle 6. It is a SIPP operator's responsibility to assess its business with reference to our six TCF consumer outcomes."

The October 2013 finalised SIPP operator guidance also set out the following:

*"**Relationships between firms that advise and introduce prospective members and SIPP operators***

Examples of good practice we observed during our work with SIPP operators include the following:

- *Confirming, both initially and on an ongoing basis, that: introducers that advise clients are authorised and regulated by the FCA; that they have the appropriate permissions to give the advice they are providing; neither the firm, nor its approved persons are on the list of prohibited individuals or cancelled firms and have a clear disciplinary history; and that the firm does not appear on the FCA website listings for unauthorised business warnings.*

- *Having terms of business agreements that govern relationships and clarify the responsibilities of those introducers providing SIPP business to a firm.*

- *Understanding the nature of the introducers' work to establish the nature of the firm, what their business objectives are, the types of clients they deal with, the levels of business they conduct and expect to introduce, the types of investments they recommend and whether they use other SIPP operators. Being satisfied that they are appropriate to deal with.*

- *Being able to identify irregular investments, often indicated by unusually small or large transactions; or higher risk investments such as unquoted shares which may be illiquid. This would enable the firm to seek appropriate clarification, for example from the prospective member or their adviser, if it has any concerns.*

- *Identifying instances when prospective members waive their cancellation rights and the reasons for this.*

Although the members' advisers are responsible for the SIPP investment advice given, as a SIPP operator the firm has a responsibility for the quality of the SIPP business it administers. Examples of good practice we have identified include:

- *conducting independent verification checks on members to ensure the information they are being supplied with, or that they are providing the firm with, is authentic and meets the firm's procedures and are not being used to launder money*

- *having clear terms of business agreements in place which govern relationships and clarify responsibilities for relationships with other professional bodies such as solicitors and accountants, and*

- *using non-regulated introducer checklists which demonstrate the SIPP operators*

have considered the additional risks involved in accepting business from nonregulated introducers

In relation to due diligence, the October 2013 Finalised SIPP Operator Guidance said:

*"**Due diligence***

Principle 2 of the FCA's Principles for Businesses requires all firms to conduct their business with due skill, care and diligence. All firms should ensure that they conduct and retain appropriate and sufficient due diligence (for example, checking and monitoring introducers as well as assessing that investments are appropriate for personal pension schemes) to help them justify their business decisions. In doing this SIPP operators should consider:

- *ensuring that all investments permitted by the scheme are permitted by HMRC, or where a tax charge is incurred, that charge is identifiable, HMRC is informed and the tax charge paid*

- *periodically reviewing the due diligence the firm undertakes in respect of the introducers that use their scheme and, where appropriate enhancing the processes that are in place in order to identify and mitigate any risks to the members and the scheme*

- *having checks which may include, but are not limited to:*

    - *ensuring that introducers have the appropriate permissions, qualifications and skills to introduce different types of business to the firm, and*
    - *undertaking additional checks such as viewing Companies House records, identifying connected parties and visiting introducers*

- *ensuring all third-party due diligence that the firm uses or relies on has been independently produced and verified*

- *good practices we have identified in firms include having a set of benchmarks, or minimum standards, with the purpose of setting the minimum standard the firm is prepared to accept to either deal with introducers or accept investments, and*

- *ensuring these benchmarks clearly identify those instances that would lead a firm to decline the proposed business, or to undertake further investigations such as instances of potential pension liberation, investments that may breach HMRC tax-relievable investments and non-standard investments that have not been approved by the firm"*

The July 2014 "*Dear CEO*" letter provides a further reminder that the Principles apply and an indication of the FCA's expectations about the kinds of practical steps a SIPP operator might reasonably take to achieve the outcomes envisaged by the Principles.

The "*Dear CEO*" letter also sets out how a SIPP operator might meet its obligations in relation to investment due diligence. It says those obligations could be met by:

- correctly establishing and understanding the nature of an investment
- ensuring that an investment is genuine and not a scam, or linked to fraudulent activity, money-laundering or pensions liberation
- ensuring that an investment is safe/secure (meaning that custody of assets is through a reputable arrangement, and any contractual agreements are correctly drawn-up and legally enforceable)

- ensuring that an investment can be independently valued, both at point of purchase and subsequently, and
- ensuring that an investment is not impaired (for example that previous investors have received income if expected, or that any investment providers are credit worthy etc.)

Although I've referred to selected parts of the publications to illustrate the relevance, I've considered these in their entirety.

I acknowledge that the 2009 and 2012 reports and the "*Dear CEO*" letter aren't formal guidance (whereas the 2013 Finalised Guidance is). However, the fact that the reports and "*Dear CEO*" letter didn't constitute formal guidance doesn't mean the importance of these should be underestimated. These provide a reminder that the Principles for Businesses apply and are an indication of the kinds of things a SIPP operator might do to ensure it's treating its customers fairly and produce the outcomes envisaged by the Principles. In that respect, the publications which set out the regulators' expectations of what SIPP operators should be doing also go some way to indicate what I consider amounts to good industry practice, and I'm therefore satisfied it's appropriate to take these into account.

It's relevant that when deciding what amounted to good industry practice in the *BBSAL* case, the Ombudsman found that "*the regulator's reports, guidance and letter go a long way to clarify what should be regarded as good practice and what should not*." And the judge in *BBSAL* endorsed the lawfulness of the approach taken by the Ombudsman.

At its introduction the 2009 Thematic Review Report says:

"*In this report, we describe the findings of this thematic review, and make clear what we expect of SIPP operator firms in the areas we reviewed. It also provides examples of good practices we found*."

And, as referenced above, the report goes on to provide "…*examples of measures that SIPP operators could consider, taken from examples of good practice that we observed and suggestions we have made to firms*."

So, I'm satisfied that the 2009 Report is a reminder that the Principles apply and it gives an indication of the kinds of things a SIPP operator might do to ensure it is treating its customers fairly and produce the outcomes envisaged by the Principles. The Report set out the regulator's expectations of what SIPP operators should be doing and therefore indicates what I consider amounts to good industry practice at the relevant time. So I remain satisfied it's relevant and therefore appropriate to take it into account.

In Carey's submissions on other cases with our Service involving SIPP due diligence, including when making its points about regulatory publications, it has referenced the *R. (on the application of Aviva Life and Pensions (UK) Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2017] EWHC 352 (Admin) case. While the judge in that case made some observations about the application of our statutory remit, that remit remains unchanged. And, as noted above, in considering what's fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of a case, I'm required to take into account (where appropriate) what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

I think the Report is also directed at firms like Carey acting purely as SIPP operators, rather than just those providing advisory services. The Report says that "*We are very clear that SIPP operators, regardless of whether they provide advice, are bound by Principle 6 of the Principles for Businesses*…" And it's noted prior to the good practice examples quoted above that "*We agree that firms acting purely as SIPP operators are not responsible for the SIPP advice given by third parties such as IFAs. However, we are also clear that SIPP*

operators cannot absolve themselves of any responsibility, and we would expect them to have procedures and controls, and to be gathering and analysing management information, enabling them to identify possible instances of financial crime and consumer detriment such as unsuitable SIPPs."

The remainder of the publications also provide a *reminder* that the Principles apply and are an indication of the kinds of things a SIPP operator might do to ensure it is treating its customers fairly and to produce the outcomes envisaged by the Principles. In that respect, these publications also go some way to indicate what I consider amounts to good industry practice at the relevant time. I therefore remain satisfied it's appropriate to take them into account too.

I've carefully considered what Carey has said about publications published after Mr D's SIPP was set up. But, like the Ombudsman in the *BBSAL* case, I don't think the fact that some of the publications post-date the events that took place in relation to Mr D's complaint, mean that the examples of good practice they provide weren't good practice at the time of the relevant events. Although the later publications were published after the events subject to this complaint, the Principles that underpin these existed throughout, as did the obligation to act in accordance with the Principles.

It's also clear from the text of the 2009 and 2012 Thematic Review Reports (and the "*Dear CEO"* letter in 2014) that the regulator expected SIPP operators to have incorporated the recommended good practices into the conduct of their business already. So, whilst the regulators' comments suggest some industry participants' understanding of how the good practice standards shaped what was expected of SIPP operators changed over time, it's clear the standards themselves hadn't changed.

I note Carey's point that the judge in *Adams* didn't consider the 2012 Thematic Review report, the 2013 SIPP Operator Guidance and 2014 "*Dear CEO*" letter to be of relevance to his consideration of Mr Adams' claim. But it doesn't follow that those publications are irrelevant to my consideration of what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. I'm required to take into account good industry practice at the relevant time. And, as mentioned, the publications indicate what I consider to amount to good industry practice at the relevant time.

That doesn't mean that in considering what's fair and reasonable, I'll only consider Carey's actions with these documents in mind. The reports, "*Dear CEO*" letter and guidance gave non-exhaustive examples of good practice. They didn't say the suggestions given were the limit of what a SIPP operator should do. As the annex to the "*Dear CEO*" letter notes, what should be done to meet regulatory obligations will depend on the circumstances.

To be clear, I don't say the Principles or the publications obliged Carey to ensure the transactions were suitable for Mr D. It's accepted Carey wasn't required to give advice to Mr D, and couldn't give advice. And I accept the publications don't alter the meaning of, or the scope of, the Principles. But as I've said above these are evidence of what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time, which would bring about the outcomes envisaged by the Principles. And, as per the FCA's Enforcement Guide, publications of this type "*illustrate ways (but not the only ways) in which a person can comply with the relevant rules*". So it's fair and reasonable for me to take them into account when deciding this complaint.

I'd also add that, even if I agreed with Carey that any publications or guidance that post-dated the events subject of this complaint don't help to clarify the type of good industry practice that existed at the relevant time (which I don't), that doesn't alter my view on what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time. That's because I find that the

2009 Report together with the Principles provide a very clear indication of what Carey could and should have done to comply with its regulatory obligations that existed at the relevant time before accepting Mr D's applications.

It's also important to keep in mind the judge in *Adams v Options* didn't consider the regulatory publications in the context of considering what's fair and reasonable in all the circumstances, bearing in mind various matters including the Principles (as part of the regulator's rules) or good industry practice.

And in determining this complaint, I need to consider whether, in accepting Mr D's application to establish a SIPP and to invest in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits, Carey complied with its regulatory obligations: to act with due skill, care and diligence; to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively; to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly; and to act honestly, fairly and professionally. In doing that, I'm looking to the Principles and the publications listed above to provide an indication of what Carey should have done to comply with its regulatory obligations and duties.

Submissions have been made about breaches of the Principles not giving rise to any cause of action at law, and breaches of guidance not giving rise to a claim for damages under FSMA. I've carefully considered these but, to be clear, it's not my role to determine whether something that's taken place gives rise to a right to take legal action. I'm deciding what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint – and for all the reasons I've set out above I'm satisfied that the Principles and the publications listed above are relevant considerations to that decision.

Furthermore, taking account of the factual context of this case, I think that in order for Carey to meet its regulatory obligations, (under the Principles and COBS 2.1.1R), amongst other things it should have undertaken sufficient due diligence into the investments *before* deciding to accept Mr D's applications.

Ultimately, what I'll be looking at here is whether Carey took reasonable care, acted with due diligence and treated Mr D fairly, in accordance with his best interests. And what I think is fair and reasonable in light of that. And I think the key issue in Mr D's complaint is whether it was fair and reasonable for Carey to have accepted his application in the first place. So, I need to consider whether Carey carried out appropriate due diligence checks on the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments before deciding to do so.

And the questions I need to consider include whether Carey ought to, acting fairly and reasonably to meet its regulatory obligations and good industry practice, have identified that consumers investing in Global Forestry and/or Carbon Credits were being put at significant risk of detriment. And, if so, whether Carey should therefore not have accepted Mr D's application.

<u>The contract between Carey and Mr D</u>

Carey has made some submissions about its contract with customers like Mr D and I've carefully considered what it has said about this.

My decision is made on the understanding that Carey acted purely as a SIPP operator. I don't say Carey should (or could) have given advice to Mr D or otherwise have ensured the suitability of the SIPP or investments for him. I accept that Carey made it clear to Mr D that it wasn't giving, nor was it able to give, advice and that it played an execution-only role in his SIPP investments. And that forms Mr D signed confirmed, amongst other things, that losses arising as a result of Carey acting on his instructions were his responsibility.

I've not overlooked or discounted the basis on which Carey was appointed. And my decision on what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of Mr D's case is made with all of this in mind. So, I've proceeded on the understanding that Carey wasn't obliged – and wasn't able – to give advice to Mr D on the suitability of the SIPP or investments.

<u>The due diligence carried out by Carey on the Global Forestry investment – and what it should have concluded</u>

Carey has said that it carried out due diligence checks on this investment, to the extent they were required to under the Principles. But I think Carey's obligations went beyond checking that the Global Forestry investment existed and would not result in tax charges. And I think Carey understood that at the time because it has provided some documents that it considered before accepting the investment as being appropriate to be held in Carey SIPPs. The evidence it's provided shows that Carey:

- Carried out a check through 'World Check' in respect of GFI, its Directors and the Trustee appointed by GFI.
- Received project summaries, legal opinion and information in respect of the title, environmental statements, ownership and the nature of the investment from the Trustee.
- Received sample copies of the rental agreements that would be put in place in respect of the plots of land invested in.
- Reviewed three Global Forestry investment brochures.

Carey summarised its understanding of the investment and its view on why it was acceptable to be held in the SIPP as follows:

"The investment was an investment into overseas leasehold forestry where plots containing 8 year old teak trees can be purchased subject to a 49 year lease. The investor then has control over the plot to either 'do their own thing', harvest the plot themselves or most probably, rent the plot subject to a sub-lease to a harvest manager to maintain and harvest the trees. The investment objective was assuming the plot is sub-let to a harvest manager tenant, returns are predicated on a fixed rental of £500 p.a, per 0.1 hectare plus up to 2% of any harvest proceeds dependent on which harvest manager is selected. (Carey) was satisfied that the land could be fairly valued by appointing a qualified surveyor/land valuer experienced in valuing the type of land in question in that jurisdiction to obtain a current market value, though (Carey) could not arrange this without the express permission of the member purchasing the land as the cost of such a valuation would be at the cost of the member's pension scheme, and (Carey) do not have permission to order such a valuation as it is an execution only provider who does not have permission to provide advice or act in such a discretionary manner."

So, while Carey did undertake some due diligence checks before permitting the investment to be held in its SIPPs, I think it needed to do more to satisfy its obligations under the Principles.

In order to correctly understand the nature of the investment, I think Carey should have also reviewed how Global Forestry was marketed to investors. And given Carey has provided copies of a 15-page and a 22-page Global Forestry brochure aimed at potential investors, it clearly thought it was important to look at this material at the time too. But I think Carey ought to have had serious concerns about some of the information within these brochures and drawn different conclusions about the appropriateness of the investment to be held in its SIPPs. Furthermore, other information I think it should have obtained, ought to have given Carey real cause for concern about the risk of consumer detriment associated with this.

Overall, in light of the evidence I've seen, I think Carey failed to draw a reasonable conclusion on accepting Mr D's application with the intention to invest in Global Forestry, for the reasons set out below.

I think the checks Carey performed ought to have gone beyond looking at the brochures produced by GFI. Carey ought to have carried out its own research, which would include making internet searches about the investment company and the individuals involved with it.

I accept Carey carried out World Checks on GFI and its Directors, which didn't identify any concerns. So I don't think Carey could've reasonably had concerns about GFI at the time.

The online marketing material I've seen on GFI's own website in November 2011, said that its tropical hardwood investments in Brazil were a "*certified, competitive, low risk*" investment.

In the Timber Investments section, on the '"Why invest in Timber?' page it said:

"Teak is a durable, appreciating physical asset that grows steadily and safely with little maintenance, putting you in control of your asset. Your Teak trees will grow substantially in value every year regardless of instability in global financial markets…

…The great news about timber is that it is the only commodity that has had a steadily rising price over 200 years, 100 years, 50 years, 10 years.

Timber is the only reliable negatively correlated asset class. This is because timber owners can withhold the forest. If they find the price of lumber low, they just don't harvest. There is no cost of storage and the tree continues to grow and increase in value."

So, the website essentially said that investing in Teak was without risk as it would increase in value regardless of the market.

On the 'Investment Opportunities' page, the Belem Sky Plantation was described as having a minimum 10% return on investment per year with an early buy back option available.

The financial returns page from November 2011 said:

"Timber has consistently proven to be a profitable investment. Over the years it has out performed many of the traditional investments but rarely appears on the investment radar for the small investor. This may be because it has often been necessary to make large investments or because ***the returns don't suffer from the fluctuations of typical investments like shares or metals****. Our projections mean that* ***you can expect a 10% return per annum on your investment*** *in the Belem Sky Plantation Project, this will be based on Rental Returns.* (my emphasis).

And in the 'IFAs' section, on a page entitled 'What we do?' the website stated:

"Investors within the Belem Sky Opportunity have benefited from the following investment features:

- *10% contractual annual return on investment*
- *Investment uncorrelated to other asset classes"*

The 22-page Global Forestry brochure which Carey has provided a copy of (and was also available to view online as a slideshow, dated 17 May 2010) also said that tropical forestry

investments provided a "*non-volatile market with high long-term returns, and a low risk-to return ratio*". And that forestry investments offer *"stable long term return projections*" with "*more dependable less volatile returns*".

It also said it offered "*Flexible exit return dates…great exit strategy flexibility*", as well as "*Early Returns*", a "*Minimum 10% ROI PA*". And that there was "*Early buy back option available*", which it went on to say was being offered by GFI "*to directly purchase your plots any time after 3 years with a return of 5%*".

In the FAQs under "*How do the projected returns compare with leaving my money in a bank?*" it said that a £5,000 investment over 25 years would produce a "*projected return of £56,849 (over 12% ROI)"* compared to an assumed average bank interest rate of 5% giving a return of £16,932.

In my view, Carey should have been concerned about how the projected returns were set out in the marketing material. I can see in the 15-page brochure that it explained returns were generated from contractual agreements between the investor and the timber management company ('TMC'). It said the TMC would provide a contractual rental income to the investor for the management of the leasehold title and retain any income generated from the anticipated thinning and/or felling of the Teak trees. And rental income would be a minimum 10% contractual annual return with additional returns from the harvest/thinning proceeds of between 2% and 5% for each investor.

But the other marketing material I've seen, such as the 22-page brochure, doesn't set out any such involvement by rental/management companies. The 22-page brochure seems to suggest that the investment income is derived directly from thinning and harvesting the trees, as opposed to rental income. So the marketing information provided to customers wasn't always transparent as to the structure of the investment and who was responsible for payment of the returns.

Furthermore, I can't see that any consideration or warning was given as to the ongoing availability of such rental agreements over the long-term in any of the brochures. And, having seen a copy of the 'Belem Sky Plantation Opportunity' leaflet, I think this was a clear risk that wasn't adequately highlighted to investors. This again referred to a minimum 10% return on investment and the early buy back option. However, it also included a legal disclaimer which seemed to suggest that there were no guarantees in respect of income after the first year of investment, i.e. no guarantee of rental agreements being in place over the long-term. So, this seemed to contradict what the other promotional materials stated about the minimum contractual return on the investment given it was being marketed as a mid to long-term investment, suitable for an investor who could commit to more than three years. And I think this information ought to have given Carey cause for concern about how the investment was being marketed. I also don't know whether a customer like Mr D would've had sight of this prior to investing, so it isn't clear whether he would've understood the return was only guaranteed for one year.

I've reviewed the sample rental agreements with the TMCs provided by Carey, and I note that only one of the three allowed for an additional 2% return from harvesting proceeds on top of a fixed annual return. So, this information conflicted with what was said in the brochure. I accept that the rental agreement Mr D signed did provide for the extra 2% return on his investment. And that the agreement stated that it could not be terminated by the TMC until a minimum period of three years had passed. But this agreement was dated 22 December 2012, so almost nine months after Mr D had invested his money in Global Forestry, so he wouldn't have enjoyed any returns during that period. And while the agreement did offer Mr D a degree of protection, I don't think it guaranteed him long-term

returns, which is what I think he'd most likely be expecting based on the way the investment was marketed.

I also recognise that a report – dated 29 March 2012 and prepared by the GFI appointed trustee in respect of the investment – said that the management companies had undertaken to pay it the rent for the first year, as well as that due for the next two to three years to be held in escrow until the rent was due to be distributed to safeguard returns between thinning. And that GFI said on page nine of the 15-page brochure that the management companies had gone through extensive due diligence before it selected these. So, this would appear to offer a three year guarantee of income payments to investors. But, other than seemingly being provided with a short paragraph as to the background of the management companies and their costs for years one to four, I can't see that Carey was provided with, or requested, any further information to understand the strength of the guarantees and undertakings being given in respect of these or that it sought to independently verify the information.

Furthermore, in the pack of information Carey has provided from September 2011, the TMC described as 'preferred' (and which Mr D entered into a rental agreement with) had no track record of tree plantation management. The document said this was an area it was 'seeking to expand into'. As such, any estimates of its costs for years one to four were not based on any experience and it had no track record of it delivering profit from tree plantation management. This compared with the other two TMCs, who had extensive experience in tree plantation management, but whose running costs were higher.

The 15-page brochure presented the TMC Mr D entered into a rental agreement with as having experience of land management, which I think a prospective investor would've considered extended to experience in tree plantation management. I think this was another issue that ought to have been flagged as being a risk that affected the promised returns. While the 10% return was described as 'guaranteed' to investors in all the materials I've seen, GFI failed to clearly state that the payment of rental income, whilst a contractual right, was still dependent on the TMC generating enough profit to fulfil the guarantees being given to investors. And that this was an inherent and significant risk of the investment, particularly given the chosen TMC, which investors were likely unaware of.

Furthermore, neither the brochures nor the website detailed how GFI planned to fund the early buy back option with a 5% return that it was responsible for. And there appears to be some inconsistency in terms of how the 5% return was described. In the 22-page brochure, it stated, *"GFI offers to directly purchase your plots any time after 3 years with a return of 5%"*. In the 15-page brochure it says, *"GFI will redeem the original investment plus 5%*". And at various times the website has set out that GFI offered to directly purchase investors plots any time after three years with a return of 5%.

But in the investment agreement Mr D signed, it states:

"After having held the Lease for a minimum of three years, the Investor shall be entitled to exercise an option, to surrender it to GFI in consideration for the payment by GFI of the original Price plus 5%"

This suggests that Mr D could redeem the investment for the original price plus 5%, so having invested £30,000, he would receive £31,500. But this is a different offering to the marketing material which suggested a 5% return on the investment, which over three years, would equate to £34,728. This is quite a significant difference, and I'm not persuaded the marketing material I think investors would've likely seen made that clear.

Neither the website nor brochure gave alternative projections in different market conditions or highlighted the risk factors associated with unregulated investments such as this. So there

wasn't sufficient explanation about the factors that the anticipated high returns were likely based on, other than the investment provider's own confidence in its business model and marketplace. I recognise that the 15-page GFI brochure that Carey has sent us showed the average timber returns over a 14-year period against global equity markets and it included a comparison in respect of projected annual returns between GFI timber and other markets, such as the FTSE 100. But it also said that this information was put together by GFI's research team. And I can see that the comparison was done on the basis that GFI would always provide a guaranteed minimum return of 10% per annum, which as I've said above, wasn't guaranteed over the long-term.

Carey should have also been concerned that neither the marketing material nor the website clearly reflected the risks. Carey clearly recognised that Global Forestry is an alternative investment and may be high risk and/or speculative in light of the member declaration. The Global Forestry investment was certainly not "*low risk*" or secure on any reasonable analysis. Despite this, it appears to have been marketed as such to pension investors.

In the IFAs section of the website, there was a page entitled 'Suitability' which appears to have been an attempt to set out which type of investors the investment might be suitable for. It stated:

"The GFI timber investment will be suitable for investors who:

- *Wish to receive a fixed annual investment return of 10% but with considerably less uncertainty than traditional stock markets*
- *Are looking to diversify their existing portfolio away from mainstream asset classes*

However, the GFI timber investment may not be suitable for investors who:

- *Do not wish to take any risk with their capital*
- *Do not wish to invest in Brazil*
- *Have a time horizon of less than three years"*

But I don't think this provided any real clarity. In fact, the implication was that the investment would be suitable for anyone who wanted to take a degree of risk (i.e. more than zero risk) and was able to commit to invest for more than three years. To my mind, this would include most investors, however inexperienced or risk averse. Furthermore, it again highlighted the guaranteed 10% return and said this came without the uncertainty of traditional stock markets – the investment was presented as more or less 'a sure bet'.

I recognise the brochures provided some warnings. For example, the 22-page brochure said that past growth rates aren't a guarantee of those in the future and should be viewed realistically. But it immediately tempered this by saying market values have realistically risen over the years. And while it said at the end of the brochure that there are no guarantees teak will go up, it again immediately tempered this by saying that it had risen every year for the past 20, that it was a very safe commodity and an excellent investment, but with no evidential basis given for these statements. The 15-page brochure similarly said that the market value of teak had steadily increased over the last 20 years.

The Global Forestry website doesn't provide any explanation behind the investor securities it said it offered or the government backing and regulation it referred to having in the brochures. The website also failed to explain that GFI didn't have any protection or regulatory status in the UK, despite offering its view on which type of investors the investment might be suitable for. I note that the legal disclaimer of the Belem Sky Plantation Opportunity leaflet explained GFI wasn't regulated and the investment wasn't regulated, meaning investors had no recourse to the Financial Ombudsman Service or the Financial

Services Compensation Scheme. But as I've said above, I'm not sure whether investors would've seen this document. And I think that this warning ought to have been given in all of the marketing materials and on the website rather than being hidden at the back of one leaflet.

I also think it's unclear what investors ownership rights were. For example, while the 22-page brochure said that all investors would receive "*A Lease/License for the land their trees occupy*", suggesting they'd have rights over the land too. But the other marketing materials spoke of investors having a beneficial interest in the property. On the Investment Process page on the GFI website from November 2011, it said investors would receive a Certificate of Declaration of Trust from the Trustee, evidencing their beneficial rights to their trees and plot. And in the FAQs section on the website, it said as the plot owner, the investor owned the trees for the duration of the Certificate of Declaration of Trust. And I think this means that Carey's belief that it could accurately value the investment by appointing a surveyor to value the land was misguided, because it appears the value of the investment was in the trees rather than the land itself.

Overall, I think that what I've highlighted above is supported by the liquidator's comments that GFI operated, or was allowed to operate, with a lack of commercial probity and that, in particular, it misled investors in relation to the security of their investment, the fixed returns, the flexible exit strategy and the environmental and social benefits.

Looking at all of the above, I think there were significant warning signs and risks associated with the Global Forestry investment, namely:

- There was no investor protection associated with this investment. It was illiquid, subject to currency fluctuations and there could be no market for it.
- There were other risks involved such as disease or drought that could've destroyed the trees allocated to investors.
- It was being targeted for investment by pension investors and was described as low risk. But it was in fact a speculative overseas based investment with inherent high risks that made it very obviously unsuitable for all but a small category of investors and even then, only a small part of such an investor's portfolio.
- The high projected returns and guarantees set out should have been questioned. I don't expect Carey to have been able to say the investment would or wouldn't have been successful. But such high projected returns and guarantees without any mention of the risks should have given Carey cause to question its credibility.
- The marketing material either didn't contain, or was unclear, as to the risks associated with the investment. So, Carey should have been concerned that consumers may have been misled or did not properly understand the investment they intended to make.
- Investor ownership rights were unclear.
- It seemingly misled investors in relation to the security of their investment, the fixed returns, the flexible exit strategy and the environmental and social benefits.
- The investment was based overseas and would be subject to the domestic laws and regulations that apply to the ownership of land and matters governing investments. That created additional risk.

The information that was available to Carey, and which would have come to light had it undertaken adequate checks, ought to have led Carey to the following conclusions:

- There was a risk the investment might be fraudulent – it wasn't clear how such high returns or guarantees could be offered.
- The land leases, if they existed, might have been difficult to independently value, both at point of purchase and subsequently. It was also possible that there might be no

market for them. So an investor might not have been able to take benefits from their pension, or make changes to it, if they wanted to.
- The investment in Global Forestry would allow Carey's clients' SIPPs to become a vehicle for a high-risk and speculative investment that wasn't a secure asset and could have been a scam.

Knowing all this, I don't think it was fair or reasonable for Carey to have accepted the Global Forestry investment into Mr D's SIPP. Following the due diligence Carey says it conducted, it should have concluded that there was a very clear and obvious risk of consumer detriment. And, without more evidence to ensure the investment was an appropriate one to permit within its SIPPs, I'm satisfied that Carey shouldn't have accepted the Global Forestry investment into Mr D's SIPP.

To my mind, Carey didn't meet its regulatory obligations or good industry practice at the relevant time. So, I think it's fair and reasonable to conclude that Carey didn't act with due skill, care and diligence, and it didn't treat Mr D fairly, by accepting the Global Forestry investment in his SIPP.

There's a difference between accepting or rejecting a particular investment for a SIPP and advising on its suitability for the individual investor. I accept that Carey wasn't expected to, nor was it able to, give advice to Mr D on the suitability of the SIPP and/or Global Forestry investment for him personally. To be clear, I'm not making a finding that Carey should have assessed the suitability of the investment for Mr D. I accept Carey had no obligation to give advice to Mr D or to ensure otherwise the suitability of an investment for him. So my finding isn't that Carey should have concluded that Mr D wasn't a suitable candidate for high-risk investments. It's that Carey should have concluded the Global Forestry investment wasn't acceptable for its SIPPs and it thereby failed to treat Mr D fairly or act with due skill, care and diligence when it accepted the investment into his SIPP.

I think it's important I emphasise here that I'm not saying that Carey should necessarily have discovered everything that later became known (following the SFO's investigation) had it undertaken sufficient due diligence before accepting the Global Forestry investment into its SIPP. But I do think that appropriate checks would have revealed some fundamental issues which were, in and of themselves, sufficient basis for Carey to have declined to accept the Global Forestry investment in its SIPPs altogether.

<u>The due diligence carried out by Carey on the Carbon Credits investment – and what it should have concluded</u>

Carey has said that it carried out due diligence checks on this investment, to the extent they were required to under the Principles. But I think Carey's obligations went beyond checking that the Carbon Credits investment existed and would not result in tax charges. And I think Carey understood that at the time because it has provided some documents that it considered before accepting the investment as being appropriate to be held in Carey SIPPs. The evidence its provided shows that Carey:

- Carried out checks through 'World Check' in respect of CAG and its Directors.
- Searched Companies House records for CAG and its Directors.
- Reviewed the investment brochure produced by CAG, project brochures and CAG's website.
- Reviewed sample applications and investment agreements.
- Reviewed the Technical Infrastructure Overview document.
- Reviewed an investment overview produced by 'Enhance'.
- Held an Investment Committee Meeting in August 2011 to consider whether to permit

Carbon Credits investments, which included reviewing the above materials.

The committee concluded that there did not appear to be a tax charge liability for the investment so it was to be permitted. However, the committee required the following in order to proceed:

- Alternative Investment Member Declaration and Indemnity for each client that wished to transact in the investment.
- Alternative Investment Adviser Notification Letter signed by each Adviser.
- Alternative Investment Provider Notification Letter signed by CAG.
- Carey Pension Trustees UK Ltd Limitation of Liability wording added to all contracts and assignment documents.

So, while Carey did undertake some due diligence checks before permitting the investment to be held in its SIPPs, I think it needed to do more to satisfy its obligations under the Principles. And it's important to note that Carey's obligations under the principles were continuous, i.e. it wasn't sufficient to carry out checks once and allow the investment to proceed, it had to be alive to developments, including any updates or commentary from the Regulator, and carry out ongoing checks to limit the risk of consumer detriment.

In August 2011, i.e. before Mr D made his investment, and likely after Carey had approved the Carbon Credits investment as an appropriate investment for Carey SIPPs, the FSA (the then regulator) issued a consumer warning about the risks of investing in carbon credit schemes. Although it stressed not all carbon credit schemes are scams, it strongly recommended consumers sought advice from an FSA-authorised financial adviser before getting involved in the carbon credit trading market. It said:

"It is not often made clear to investors that this involves trading on over-the-counter markets which require experience and skill. You may lose money or not be able to sell at all…

Beware that VERs certificates are often labelled as 'certified', but this certification is voluntary involving a wide range of bodies and different quality standards that are not recognised by any UK financial compensation scheme…"

"…Just because the salesperson mentions the Kyoto Protocol or 'government-backed' plans does not tell you anything about the type of carbon credit you are investing in."

These investments were unlikely to be suitable for the majority of retail investors. And they were only generally likely to be suitable for a small element of the investment portfolio of a sophisticated investor.

I think this was something Carey recognised, given it approved the investment with caveats. Following the Investment Committee meeting, Carey wrote to CAG, stating that it had approved the investment but had some additional requirements, which included members taking their own tax, investment and financial advice to determine whether it was a suitable investment for them. And that it suggested no more 50% of members' funds should be invested in this asset given the potential liquidity issues. So, the indemnity Carey required Mr D to sign asked him to confirm he had taken appropriate advice. And given the Regulator's warning, I think requiring investors to take regulated financial advice would've gone some way to meeting the requirements under the Principles and to protect consumers from detriment.

However, I think Carey ought to have known that Mr D hadn't taken advice on the investment from a regulated firm given his introduction was made through ILAWS, which

wasn't regulated in any capacity. And as I'll go on to explain below, the involvement of Firm E shouldn't have led Carey to think Mr D had received advice. This alone ought to have given Carey grounds for refusing to permit Mr D's investment in Carbon Credits. But I think Carey ought to have had other serious concerns about some of the information it gathered during the due diligence process and drawn different conclusions about the appropriateness of the investment to be held in its SIPPs. Furthermore, other information I think it should have obtained, ought to have given Carey real cause for concern about the risk of consumer detriment associated with this.

Taking everything into account, I'm satisfied that Carey should – as a minimum – have:

- Identified the Carbon Credits investment as a high-risk, speculative and non-standard investment and carried out due diligence on it.
- Correctly established and understood the nature of the investment.
- Considered whether the investment was an appropriate investment to make available via its SIPPs.
- Made sure the investment was genuine and not a scam, or linked to fraudulent activity.
- Made sure the investment worked as claimed.
- Ensured that the investment could be independently valued, both at the point of purchase and subsequently.

A key issue with Carbon Credits is there is no price transparency – there is no independent source regarding the price being set, and nothing to confirm at what price the credits should be acquired. So, there was no way to establish how the purchase price was being arrived at. As such, there could've been a very significant difference between the price the units were acquired at and the price these were sold to Mr D at. This is something Carey could have and should have investigated further.

Also, assuming that Mr D would hold valid units or credits, there doesn't appear to be any measure of the quality of the credits in question. There is reference in the CAG investment brochure to the Carbon Credits it offered having the Verified Carbon Standard ('VCS') accreditation. But the brochure described the Carbon Credits available through the voluntary carbon market as Voluntary Emission Reductions ('VERs'). And the other information Carey appears to have reviewed was specific to VERs.

It appears the intention was for Mr D to purchase VERs – a VER purchase agreement was completed in December 2011 showing Mr D would be purchasing 2,185 credits at a price of £5.95 per tonne in the India Wind project. The agreement also stated the credits were 'VCS'. But the agreement Mr D actually completed was for CERs. The ERPA showed Mr D had purchased 1,165 CERs with a unit price of £12 per tonne. So, the information Carey had reviewed prior to agreeing to permit the Carbon Credits investments didn't correlate to the investment Mr D went on to make. And this purchase agreement, unlike the agreement Mr D initially completed for the VERs, didn't state the project or the standard of the units he was investing in.

I appreciate that the transfer certificate for the CERs sent to Carey included the serial numbers for the credits purchased and a web link to the project the credits originated from on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ('UNFCCC') website. I've been able to access this website using the internet archive 'Wayback Machine' and a snapshot from 25 December 2007 shows that Mr D's carbon credits were derived from a Greenhouse Gas mitigation project in Mexico. And, it does appear the credits were registered with the UNFCCC and as such, were valid.

However, while Carey could've been satisfied the credits Mr D was purchasing were valid, I haven't seen that it was demonstrated there was any ready market for Mr D's units. It wasn't demonstrated how Mr D would find businesses to buy his small allocation of Carbon Credits. And I note the Terms and Conditions attached to the ERPA stated:

"There may be a big difference between the buying price and the selling price of Carbon Credits. If you have to sell them immediately, you may get back much less than you paid for them. You may have difficulty in selling Carbon Credits at the price you wish to achieve and, in some circumstances; it may be difficult to sell them at any price. It can be difficult to assess what would be a proper market price for these investments. You should not invest in Carbon Credits unless you have thought carefully about whether you can afford to do so and have taken appropriate independent advice."

So, at the time there was little confirmation that Mr D's SIPP was acquiring anything of any realisable value, whether the units were being sold at inflated prices and whether there was a market for them. I also think these were risks Carey was aware of, because it noted the market was immature and it also took steps to limit the exposure to the investment in its SIPPs.

And I don't think simply noting and making Mr D aware of these issues was consistent with the Principles and good practice. I think Carey needed to weigh up these concerns and features and consider whether it was an appropriate investment to be held in customers' pensions.

Carey may consider that carrying out the kind of assessment that would be required to establish and interrogate such factors as I've discussed and carry out appropriate due diligence, imposes on it requirements over and above its responsibilities as a SIPP provider. But I'm satisfied these are the kind of things Carey needed to do when accepting Mr D's proposed investment to meet its regulatory obligations and good practice. And, I don't think that this amounts to a conclusion that Carey should've assessed the suitability of the Carbon Credits investment for Mr D's individual circumstances.

So, based on the evidence I've seen, I'm satisfied that Carey didn't carry out sufficient due diligence at the time to satisfy its reasonable responsibilities as a SIPP provider.

<u>If Carey had completed sufficient due diligence on Mr D's Carbon Credits investment, what should it reasonably have concluded?</u>

I think the Carbon Credits Mr D was intending to purchase were likely legitimate, given what I've seen on the UNFCCC website. And this reflects the FSA's warning that not all carbon credit investments are scams. I also accept that technically there was a market for carbon credits. But it's been highlighted that it often wasn't possible to sell them even though there was a market for them. And even the ERPA terms acknowledged it might not be possible to sell the credits at all. So, although they technically worked as claimed, the reality was very different.

The FSA warning was published before Mr D's SIPP was set up and this made it clear that there may be issues with selling carbon credits. I'm satisfied this is something Carey should've not only identified as part of its due diligence but considered a significant factor in deciding whether to permit the investment. The fact Mr D might have struggled to realise the investment should've caused it significant concern – especially considering that almost 30% of Mr D's funds in the SIPP were invested in Carbon Credits, and his remaining funds were also being invested in a high-risk, speculative venture. It also isn't clear how Mr D would be able to take benefits from his pension if the investment was difficult to value or realise.

At the point Mr D's investment was arranged, Carey would've been aware that he was investing a significant portion of his pension fund in an unregulated, esoteric and high-risk investment which would likely be difficult to sell. I acknowledge that Carey wouldn't be aware whether the amounts being invested in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits was the entirety of Mr D's pension savings because he may have had other benefits elsewhere (though Mr D has told us this was his only pension). But it was an indicator of the kind of risk to which Mr D was being exposed. These were 'red flags', so to speak, which should've caused Carey significant concern as to whether or not the investment was appropriate to be held in members' SIPPs.

It could be argued that not being able to independently value an investment wouldn't be indicative of its performance or legitimacy. But the investment was predicated on the Carbon Credits being sold for more than what was paid for them. And so, I think there should've been concerns if it wasn't possible to independently value them. And if an independent valuation had been possible, it's now been highlighted that voluntary carbon credits were often sold at "significantly inflated prices" so it seems likely this would then have been identified. This would effectively render the investment fundamentally unviable.

Carey should also have been aware that investors would be unlikely to benefit, in terms of the investment itself, from any regulatory protections (the investment being unregulated) such as access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme or the Financial Ombudsman Service.

In the circumstances, I'm satisfied there were a number of concerns Carey should've identified. It should've known there was a significant risk of consumer detriment, and it shouldn't have permitted the investment to be held in its SIPP. When doing so, I think it didn't act with due skill, care and diligence or treat Mr D fairly.

To be clear, I reiterate, I'm not making a finding that Carey should've assessed the suitability of the Carbon Credits investment for Mr D. I accept Carey had no obligation to give advice to Mr D, or to ensure otherwise the suitability of an investment for him.

I'm satisfied Carey could've identified the concerns I've mentioned, and ought to have drawn the conclusions I've set out, based on what was known at the time. Carey ought to have identified significant concerns in relation to the investment, and it ought to have led it to conclude it shouldn't accept the Carbon Credit Investment into its SIPPs before it accepted Mr D's application to invest in Carbon Credits. It ought to have identified that there was a high risk of consumer detriment here. And it's the failure of Carey's due diligence that's resulted in Mr D being treated unfairly and unreasonably.

In my opinion Carey didn't meet its regulatory obligations or the standards of good practice at the time, and it allowed Mr D's pension fund to be put at significant risk as a result. So, I think it's fair and reasonable to conclude that Carey didn't act with due skill, care and diligence, and it didn't treat Mr D fairly, by accepting the Carbon Credits investment in his SIPP.

Carey's due diligence on ILAWS

Carey also had a duty to conduct due diligence and give thought to whether to accept Mr D's SIPP application from ILAWS. That's consistent with the Principles and the Regulators' publications as set out earlier in this decision.

But I don't think I need to consider Carey's due diligence on ILAWS. That's because I'm satisfied the transfer of Mr D's existing pension to a SIPP was arranged for the purpose of investing in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits. I say this because the SIPP application

form stated that Mr D intended to invest in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits. So, from the outset of Mr D's relationship with Carey, it was aware that his intention was to invest his pension funds in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits.

As such, I don't think it is necessary for me to consider what due diligence checks Carey ought to have carried out on ILAWS, and what it ought to have determined from those checks had it carried them out, in detail. That's because I think Carey failed to comply with its regulatory obligations and good industry practice at the relevant time when it accepted Mr D's applications to invest in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits through his SIPP. And I'm satisfied it ought to have declined to accept Mr D's applications to make those investments in the first place.

That being said, I do think there were obvious issues with the introduction from ILAWS, and the process Carey required Mr D to undertake before it allowed him to make the investment. It ought to have been clear to Carey from the outset that ILAWS wasn't regulated in any capacity to arrange or advise on investments or pensions. But had it checked ILAWS' website at the time of the introduction it would've found that ILAWS was holding itself out as being able to advise on investments. The involvement of Firm E also ought to have been questioned, particularly as all contact and correspondence with Carey came from ILAWS and Firm E gave ILAWS' contact details in the SIPP application form. And I don't think Carey had any real grounds to believe Mr D had received advice from Firm E, particularly as no advice fee (initial or ongoing) was paid to it from the SIPP. And in signing the SIPP application form declaration, Mr D confirmed he was establishing the SIPP on an execution only basis.

Furthermore, in asking Mr D to sign its SIPP member instruction and declaration for Global Forestry, Carey required him to confirm that he had discussed the investment with his Financial Adviser. And the member instruction and declaration for investing with CAG required him to confirm he had taken appropriate advice. But Carey ought to have known that Mr D most likely didn't have a financial adviser, other than ILAWS. And although there was nothing to stop ILAWS from giving Mr D advice, and it appears it did give him advice here, Carey ought to have known ILAWS was not regulated and as such, not authorised to give him such advice. And Carey should've been alive to the risk that ILAWS was advising customers and this posed a significant risk to consumers. At the very least Carey ought to have been aware that ILAWS had arranged the SIPP and investments, in breach of regulations. And it ought to have proceeded with extreme caution so as to limit the risk of detriment to Mr D.

I also note that Carey appears to have undertaken some due diligence checks on ILAWS throughout 2012 to 2014, including putting a non-regulated introducer agreement in place. This was after the introduction of Mr D's business. However, the relationship with ILAWS, and in particular, Mr M, was terminated in 2014 because of the misleading information he was providing to customers. And in February 2013 it was noted by a representative of Carey that Mr M and ILAWS had been 'delisted' for some time. So, it seems to me that if Carey had carried out sufficient due diligence checks on ILAWS before accepting Mr D's applications, it would've likely declined to deal with ILAWS for the same reasons Carey decided terminated its relationship with it in 2014.

Nevertheless, based on what I've seen, Mr D's application to take out the SIPP was to make the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments. And, for reasons I'll come on to below, if those applications had been declined/rejected then his application to open the SIPP and switch his pension would not have gone ahead. His SIPP therefore would not have been opened and his pension would have stayed where it was.

So I've not gone on to consider the due diligence Carey may have carried out on ILAWS and whether this was sufficient to meet its regulatory obligations in any more detail.

Did Carey act fairly and reasonably in proceeding with Mr D's instructions?

COBS 11.2.19R

I note that Carey has made the point that COBS 11.2.19R obliged it to execute investment instructions. It effectively says that once the SIPP has been established, it is required to execute the specific instructions of its client.

Carey's argument about having to execute the transaction as a result of COBS 11.2.19R was considered and rejected by the judge in *BBSAL*. In that case Jacobs J said:

'The heading to COBS 11.2.1R shows that it is concerned with the manner in which orders are to be executed: i.e. on terms most favourable to the client. This is consistent with the heading to COBS 11.2 as a whole, namely: "Best execution". The text of COBS 11.2.1R is to the same effect. The expression "when executing orders" indicates that it is looking at the moment when the firm comes to execute the order, and the way in which the firm must then conduct itself. It is concerned with the "mechanics" of execution; a conclusion reached, albeit in a different context, in Bailey & Anr v Barclays Bank [2014] EWHC 2882 (QB), paras [34] – [35]. It is not addressing an anterior question, namely whether a particular order should be executed at all. I agree with the FCA's submission that COBS 11.2 is a section of the Handbook concerned with the method of execution of client orders, and is designed to achieve a high quality of execution. It presupposes that there is an order being executed, and refers to the factors that must be taken into account when deciding how best to execute the order. It has nothing to do with the question of whether or not the order should be accepted in the first place.'

I therefore don't think that Carey's argument on this point is relevant to its obligations under the Principles to decide whether or not to execute the instruction to make the Global Forestry or Carbon Credits investments i.e. to proceed with the applications.

The indemnity

In my view, for the reasons given, Carey should've refused to allow Mr D's investment in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits and his application to open the SIPP on the basis of those proposed investments. So, things shouldn't have progressed beyond that. Had Carey acted in accordance with its regulatory obligations and best practice, it is fair and reasonable in my view to conclude that it shouldn't have permitted the investments.

Further, in my view it's fair and reasonable to say that just having Mr D sign declarations, wasn't an effective way for Carey to meet its regulatory obligations to treat him fairly, given the concerns Carey ought to have had about the investments.

Carey knew that Mr D had signed forms intended, amongst other things, to indemnify it against losses that arose from acting on his instructions. And, in my opinion, relying on the contents of such forms when Carey knew, or ought to have known, allowing the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments to be held within its SIPPs would put investors at significant risk wasn't the fair and reasonable thing to do. The fair and reasonable thing to do would have been to refuse to accept the investments in its SIPPs at all.

The Principles exist to ensure regulated firms treat their clients fairly. And I don't think the paperwork Mr D signed meant that Carey could ignore its duty to treat him fairly. To be clear, I'm satisfied that indemnities contained within the contractual documents don't absolve, nor

do they attempt to absolve, Carey of its regulatory obligations to treat customers fairly when deciding whether to accept or reject investments.

Ultimately I'm satisfied that Mr D's investment in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits shouldn't have been permitted and so the opportunity to proceed in reliance on an indemnity shouldn't have arisen at all.

Is it fair to ask Carey to compensate Mr D?

The involvement of other parties

In this decision I'm considering Mr D's complaint about Carey. However, I accept that it's likely other parties were involved in the transaction complained about, possibly ILAWS, but also CAG and/or GFI.

The DISP rules set out that when an Ombudsman's determination includes a money award, then that money award may be such amount as the Ombudsman considers to be fair compensation for financial loss, whether or not a Court would award compensation (DISP 3.7.2R).

As I set out above, in my opinion it's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this case to hold Carey accountable for its own failure to comply with the regulatory obligations, good industry practice and to treat Mr D fairly, and the starting point, therefore, is that it would be fair to require Carey to pay Mr D compensation for the loss he's suffered as a result of Carey's failings.

But I've carefully considered if there's any reason why it wouldn't be fair to ask Carey to compensate Mr D for his loss, including whether it would be fair to hold another party liable in full or in part. Whilst I accept that it may be the case that another party might have some responsibility for initiating the course of action that led to Mr D's loss, I'm satisfied that it's also the case that if Carey had complied with its own distinct regulatory obligations as a SIPP operator, the investments in Carbon Credits and Global Forestry wouldn't have come about in the first place, and the loss he's suffered could have been avoided.

So it is my view that it's appropriate and fair in the circumstances for Carey to compensate Mr D to the full extent of the financial losses he's suffered due to Carey's failings. And, taking into account the combination of factors I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that it would be appropriate or fair in the circumstances to reduce the compensation amount that Carey is liable to pay to Mr D.

Mr D taking responsibility for his own investment decisions

In reaching my conclusions I've thought about section 5(2)(d) of the FSMA (now section 1C). This section requires the FCA, in securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, to have regard to, amongst other things, the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their own investment decisions.

I've considered this carefully, but I'm satisfied that it wouldn't be fair or reasonable to say Mr D's actions mean he should bear the loss arising as a result of Carey's failings. Mr D used the services of a regulated personal pension provider in Carey. In my view, if Carey had acted in accordance with its regulatory obligations and good industry practice it shouldn't have accepted Mr D's application to invest in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits at all. That should have been the end of the matter – if either of those things had happened, I'm satisfied the arrangement for Mr D wouldn't have come about in the first place, and the loss he's suffered could have been avoided.

As I've made clear, Carey needed to carry out appropriate initial and ongoing due diligence on the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments and reach the right conclusions. I think it failed to do this. And just having Mr D sign forms containing declarations wasn't an effective way of Carey meeting its obligations, or of escaping liability where it failed to meet its obligations.

I've carefully considered what Carey has previously said about customers being aware of the risks and having signed documents confirming that the investments were high risk. But, as I've said, I don't agree that the evidence I've seen supports the contention that it's more likely than not that Mr D understood the investments were high risk, in particular, given the Global Forestry investment was marketed as low risk. And, in any eventuality, this is a secondary point because, as mentioned above, if Carey had acted in accordance with its regulatory obligations and good industry practice I'm satisfied the arrangement for Mr D wouldn't have come about in the first place.

So, overall, I'm satisfied that in the circumstances, for all the reasons given, it's fair and reasonable to say Carey should compensate Mr D for the loss he's suffered. I don't think it would be fair to say in the circumstances that Mr D should suffer the loss because he ultimately instructed the transactions be effected.

Had Carey declined to accept Mr D's investments in Carbon Credits and Global Forestry, would the transaction complained about still have been effected elsewhere?

In deciding whether Carey is responsible for any losses that Mr D has suffered, I need to look at what would have happened if Carey had done what it should have done i.e. refused to allow Mr D's investments in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits and his application to open the SIPP on the basis of those proposed investments in the first place.

As I've explained above, if Carey had acted fairly and reasonably it should have concluded that it should not accept Mr D's applications. That should have been the end of the matter – it should have told Mr D that it could not accept the business. And I am satisfied, if that had happened, the arrangement for Mr D would not have come about in the first place, and the loss he suffered could have been avoided.

I don't think there is any persuasive evidence that Mr D would have gone ahead with the transfer of his existing pension and made the investments if Carey had refused his applications. I'm not persuaded that if Mr D had understood the risks that he would have been prepared to risk what appears to have been his only pension provision at the time, particularly given he's provided testimony that he only ever made low risk investments. And that he only proceeded here because he was told the investments were low-risk. Furthermore, Mr D says it was through a chance meeting that he met Mr M of ILAWS, and it was ILAWS who introduced the idea of transferring his pension in order to make these investments. Mr D hadn't previously been interested in reviewing his pension arrangements or investing specifically in Global Forestry or Carbon Credits.

So I'm satisfied that Mr D would not have continued with the SIPP and the investment, had it not been for Carey's failings. Carey failed to put a stop to this course of action when it had the opportunity and obligation to do so, if it had been acting in Mr D's best interests.

I have considered the *Adams v Options* High Court judgment, which says:

"The investment here was acknowledged by the claimant to be high risk and/or speculative. He accepted responsibility for evaluating that risk and for deciding to proceed in knowledge of the risk. A duty to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of the client,

who is to take responsibility for his own decisions, cannot be construed in my judgment as meaning that the terms of the contract should be overlooked, that the client is not to be treated as able to reach and take responsibility for his own decisions and that his instructions are not to be followed."

For all the reasons I've set out, I'm satisfied that it would not be fair to say Mr D's actions mean he should bear the loss arising as a result of Carey's failings. I do not say Carey should not have accepted the application because the investments were high risk. I acknowledge Mr D was warned of the high risk and declared he understood that warning.

But, as I set out above, Carey did not share significant warning signs with him in respect of the investments so that he could make an informed decision about whether to proceed or not. In any event, Carey should not have asked him to sign the indemnity at all as the application should never have been accepted or alternatively the transaction should have been terminated at a much earlier stage in the process.

Carey might say that if it hadn't permitted the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments in its SIPPs, that the switch and investments would still have been effected with a different SIPP provider. But I don't think it's fair and reasonable to say that Carey shouldn't compensate Mr D for his loss on the basis of speculation that another SIPP operator would have made the same mistakes as I've found Carey did. I think it's fair instead to assume that another SIPP provider would have complied with its regulatory obligations and good industry practice, and therefore wouldn't have permitted the investments into its SIPPs.

Having taken everything Carey has said into consideration, I think that it's appropriate and fair in the circumstances for Carey to compensate Mr D to the full extent of the financial losses he's suffered due to Carey's failings. And, having carefully considered everything, I don't think that it would be appropriate or fair in the circumstances to reduce the compensation amount that Carey is liable to pay to him.

Conclusion

Having carefully considered all of the circumstances, I'm satisfied it's fair and reasonable to conclude that if Carey had refused to permit the Global Forestry and Carbon Credits investments in its SIPPs then Mr D would've retained his existing pension and wouldn't have switched to a SIPP or subsequently made the investments that he did. So Carey should put him back in the position he would have been in.

Overall, I think it's fair and reasonable to direct Carey to pay Mr D compensation in the circumstances. While I accept that other parties might have some responsibility for initiating the course of action that's led to Mr D's loss, I consider that Carey failed to comply with its own obligations and didn't put a stop to the transactions proceeding by declining to accept Mr D's applications when it had the opportunity to do so. As such, I'm not asking Carey to account for loss that goes beyond the consequences of its failings. I'm satisfied those failings have caused the full extent of the loss in question. I'm of the opinion that it's appropriate and fair in the circumstances for Carey to compensate Mr D to the full extent of the financial losses he's suffered due to its failings, and notwithstanding any failings by other firms involved in the transactions.

As set out above, I'm satisfied that Carey should've put a stop to the transaction and that any subsequent investments wouldn't have gone ahead if it had treated Mr D fairly and reasonably. I've carefully considered causation, contributory negligence, apportionment of damages and DISP 3.6.4. But in the circumstances here, I'm still satisfied it's fair for Carey to compensate Mr D for his full loss.

Putting things right

My aim is to return Mr D to the position he would now be in but for Carey's failure to carry out appropriate due diligence checks.

As I've already mentioned above – if Carey had refused to permit Mr D to invest in Global Forestry and Carbon Credits through its SIPP, I'm satisfied the investments would not have gone ahead and Mr D would've retained his existing pension provision.

In light of the above, Carey should calculate fair compensation by comparing the current position to the position Mr D would be in if he hadn't transferred his existing pension plan to the Carey SIPP. In summary, Carey should:

1) Obtain the current notional value, as at the date of this decision, of Mr D's previous pension plan, if it hadn't been transferred to the SIPP.

2) Obtain the actual current value of Mr D's SIPP, as at the date of this decision, less any outstanding charges.

3) Deduct the sum arrived at in step 2) from the sum arrived at in step 1).

4) Pay a commercial value to buy Mr D's share in any investments that cannot currently be redeemed.

5) Pay an amount into Mr D's SIPP, so that the transfer value of the SIPP is increased by an amount equal to the loss calculated in step 3). This payment should take account of any available tax relief and the effect of charges. The payment should also take account of interest as set out below.

6) Pay Mr D £500 for the distress and inconvenience the problems with his pension have caused him.

I've explained how Carey should carry out the calculation, set out in steps 1 - 6 above, in further detail below:

1) *Obtain the current notional value, as at the date of this decision, of Mr D's previous pension plan, if it hadn't been transferred to the SIPP.*

   As I haven't heard anything from Mr D to the contrary, I've proceeded on the basis that Mr D's previous pension was a personal (defined contribution) pension plan without any guarantees attached.

   Carey should ask the operator of Mr D's previous pension plan to calculate the current notional value of Mr D's plan, as at the date of this decision, had he not transferred into the SIPP. Carey must also ask the same operator to make a notional allowance in the calculations, so as to allow for any additional sums Mr D has contributed to, or withdrawn from, his Carey SIPP since the outset. To be clear this doesn't include SIPP charges or fees paid to third parties like an advisor.

   Any notional contributions or notional withdrawals to be allowed for in the calculations should be deemed to have occurred on the date on which monies were actually credited to, or withdrawn from, the Carey SIPP by Mr D.

   If there are any difficulties in obtaining a notional valuation from the operator of Mr D's previous pension plan, Carey should instead calculate a notional valuation by

ascertaining what the monies transferred away from the plan would now be worth, as at the date of this decision, had they achieved a return from the date of transfer equivalent to the FTSE UK Private Investors Income Total Return Index (prior to 1 March 2017, the FTSE WMA Stock Market Income total return index).

I'm satisfied that's a reasonable proxy for the type of return that could have been achieved over the period in question. And, again, there should be a notional allowance in this calculation for any additional sums Mr D has contributed to, or withdrawn from, his Carey SIPP since the outset.

2) *Obtain the actual current value of Mr D's SIPP, as at the date of this decision, less any outstanding charges.*

   This should be the current value as at the date of this decision.

3) *Deduct the sum arrived at in step 2) from the sum arrived at in step 1).*

   The total sum calculated in step 1) minus the sum arrived at in step 2), is the loss to Mr D's pension provisions.

4) *Pay a commercial value to buy Mr D's share in any investments that cannot currently be redeemed.*

   I'm satisfied that Mr D's Carey SIPP only still exists because of the illiquid investments that are held within it. And that but for these investments Mr D's remaining monies could have been transferred away from Carey. In order for the SIPP to be closed and further SIPP fees to be prevented, any remaining investments need to be removed from the SIPP.

   To do this Carey should reach an amount it's willing to accept as a commercial value for the investments, and pay this sum into the SIPP and take ownership of the relevant investments.

   If Carey is unwilling or unable to purchase the investments, then the actual value of any investments it doesn't purchase should be assumed to be nil for the purposes of the redress calculation. To be clear, this would include their being given a nil value for the purposes of ascertaining the current value of Mr D's SIPP in step 2).

   If Carey doesn't purchase the investments, it may ask Mr D to provide an undertaking to account to it for the net amount of any payment the SIPP may receive from these investments. That undertaking should allow for the effect of any tax and charges on the amount Mr D may receive from the investments, and any eventual sums he would be able to access from the SIPP. Carey will need to meet any costs in drawing up the undertaking.

5) *Pay an amount into Mr D's SIPP, so that the transfer value of the SIPP is increased by an amount equal to the loss calculated in step 3). This payment should take account of any available tax relief and the effect of charges. The payment should also take account of interest as set out below.*

   The amount paid should allow for the effect of charges and any available tax relief. Compensation shouldn't be paid into a pension plan if it would conflict with any existing protections or allowances.

If Carey is unable to pay the compensation into Mr D's SIPP, or if doing so would give rise to protection or allowance issues, it should instead pay that amount direct to him. But had it been possible to pay into the plan, it would have provided a taxable income. Therefore, the compensation should be reduced to *notionally* allow for any income tax that would otherwise have been paid.

The *notional* allowance should be calculated using Mr D's actual or expected marginal rate of tax in retirement at his selected retirement age.

It's reasonable to assume that Mr D is likely to be a basic rate taxpayer at his selected retirement age, so the reduction would equal 20%. However, if Mr D would have been able to take a tax free lump sum, the reduction should be applied to 75% of the compensation, resulting in an overall reduction of 15%.

6) *Pay Mr D £500 for the distress and inconvenience the problems with his pension have caused him.*

In addition to the financial loss that Mr D has suffered as a result of the problems with his pension, I think that the loss suffered has caused him distress. And I think that it's fair for Carey to compensate him for this as well. I think £500 is a reasonable sum given that Carey's actions led to a total loss to Mr D's pension, which will have been a significant source of worry for him as he approached retirement.

SIPP fees

If the investment can't be removed from the SIPP, and because of this it can't be closed after compensation has been paid, then it wouldn't be fair for Mr D to have to pay annual SIPP fees to keep the SIPP open. So, if the SIPP needs to be kept open only because of the illiquid investment and is used only or substantially to hold that asset, then any future SIPP fees should be waived until the SIPP can be closed.

Interest

The compensation resulting from this loss assessment must be paid to Mr D or into his SIPP within 28 days of the date Carey receives notification of Mr D's acceptance of my final decision. Interest must be added to the compensation amount at the rate of 8% per year simple from the date of my final decision to the date of settlement if the compensation isn't paid within 28 days.

My final decision

For the reasons given above, I uphold this complaint.

I require Options UK Personal Pensions LLP (which I have referred to as Carey throughout this decision) to calculate and pay fair compensation to Mr D as set out above.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr D to accept or reject my decision before 13 May 2024.

Hannah Wise
Ombudsman