

The complaint

Mr H Hargreaves Lansdown Asset Management Limited's (HL) promotion of the Woodford Equity Income Fund (WEIF). He says that the information HL had made available on its website regarding the WEIF's performance was misleading and had been contributory to his investment loss. Mr H is unhappy that the WEIF was promoted by HL through its commentary and inclusion in the Wealth lists up to the point of suspension. He questions HL's research teams process for vetting recommended funds and whether that was fit for purpose. Mr H feels HLAM are responsible for his losses.

What happened

The investment Mr H bought from HL was called the Woodford Equity Income Fund (WEIF), managed by Neil Woodford, who left Invesco Perpetual in 2013 to set up Woodford Investment Management ("WIM"). The WEIF was launched in May 2014, with a £1 per unit fixed offer price until 18 June 2014. The Authorised Corporate Director (ACD) of the fund was Capita Financial Managers, later known as Link Fund Solutions.

The WEIF broadly tracked the benchmarks (albeit whilst providing a greater return and experiencing some more volatility) until the second half of 2017, when there was a significant fall which was not experienced by the benchmarks. It began to significantly underperform benchmarks from early 2018 and the performance followed a very different pattern to the benchmarks from early 2019 to the date of suspension.

Alongside this, the fund began to see significant outflows from mid-2017, falling from around £10bn of assets under management to around £3bn in two years. In June 2019 the extent of those outflows - and the portion of the WEIF's assets which were not liquid - led Link to decide to suspend trading in the fund. Link removed WIM as the investment manager around this time.

The fund did not trade again. Later in 2019, Link decided to liquidate the fund. Investors have since received payments as and when the fund's assets have been sold. A small amount remains invested in assets which are not liquid i.e. cannot currently be sold. A scheme of arrangement between investors and Link has now been sanctioned by the court and will conclude the wind up of the fund with further distributions being made to investors who held units in the fund at suspension.

HL's communications relating to the WEIF

HL's relationship with WIM and the WEIF began prior to the fund's launch. HL met with WIM in early 2014 and decided to promote the WEIF to its customers and visitors to its website ahead of the fund's launch.

The WEIF was the subject of, or featured in, many communications from HL over the period from the fund's launch.

HL's communications relating to the WEIF can be categorised broadly as follows:

- Promotion of the WEIF at its launch by letter and through website articles and emails.
- Ongoing promotion of the WEIF through website articles (and, in some instances, emails alerting the recipient to the article).
- Updates on the WEIF through website articles (and emails alerting the recipient to the article).
- The inclusion of the WEIF in “best buy” lists – called the Wealth 150 (which had a subset of discounted funds called the Wealth 150+) and, later, the Wealth 50 – both of which were shared on its website, through emails and via Wealth Reports, which were included in the Investment Times sent to its clients by post.

The Wealth List

HL published a list of what it considered, in its view, to be the “best” or “favourite” funds. This was initially called the Wealth 150 (and a subset of this, featuring discounted management charges for HL clients, the Wealth 150+) then later the Wealth 50 – I’ll refer to these generally as the Wealth List. The WEIF featured on the Wealth List from its launch until its suspension.

I understand the list was available on HL’s website to any visitor and also sent to all customers on its general mailing list who had elected to receive communications, alongside the bi-annual Wealth Reports published by HL. HL says the list was updated from time to time with funds being added or removed as a result of the ongoing cycle of review, monitoring and analysis of funds by its investment team. As part of its ongoing research HL met with WIM to discuss the WEIF on a number of occasions.

Mr H’s dealings in the WEIF

Mr H bought income units in the WEIF via his ISA in May 2016, investing £7,500. He continued investing in the WEIF smaller amounts until March 2019. In March 2015 and January 2017 he invested £15,500 in accumulation units in the WEIF and continued reinvesting the income until April 2019.

Mr H continued to hold all his units in the WEIF until its suspension. As part of the WEIF’s liquidation, capital distribution payments were paid to consumers and calculated based on the number of units consumers held. Mr H received a number of these payments in his ISA.

Although not the subject of this complaint, a Scheme of Arrangement is now in place with the WEIF’s ACD which will likely make, if it hasn’t already made, additional payments to investors in the WEIF who, like Mr H, retained units in it at suspension.

Mr H’s complaint to HL and its response

In October 2019 Mr H complained to HL. In short he complained about HL’s continued inclusion of the WEIF on its Wealth lists and asked questions around who vetted and reviewed HL’s Wealth Lists.

He also asked questions about the indicators that led HL to include WEIF on its Wealth lists, particularly in the same year it was wound up and subsequently liquidated – and what future measures HL would implement to ensure other funds were “properly reviewed”.

HL looked into Mr H’s complaint but didn’t agree it had done anything wrong.

It acknowledged the “*difficult period of performance*” that the fund had experienced, but said that its convictions in the long term prospects of the fund remained until the WEIF’s suspension. It said most fund managers would have periods of time when their funds underperformed and explained how it considered Woodford’s investment approach and why it believed, at the time, that his track record and his approach to investment would mean that the fund would outperform its respective benchmarks in the long term.

It said that its investment team chose the WEIF for its Wealth Lists on the basis of Woodford’s track record as a “*talented stock picker*” as well as a number of other indicators such as the manager’s “*stock selection and style*” as well as their track record.

It said that it provided an “*execution only*” service to Mr H and this did not involve personalised investment advice or managing his investments. It said that as part of the services it provided, it made information available to its customers (compiled by its investment research team) to help them decide where to invest. Whenever it provided its views on an investment, including the WEIF, it was obliged to ensure this information was clear, fair and not misleading. It said that its opinions on the WEIF had always been properly held and based on the research and due diligence it carried out. It said that there could be no guarantees when investing and ultimately, the decision to invest and to remain invested in a particular fund rested with Mr H.

Mr H remained unhappy and the complaint was referred to this service.

One of our investigators looked into the complaint but didn’t consider it should be upheld. In short, he concluded that HL’s communications met its regulatory obligations and were clear, fair and not misleading.

Mr H didn’t agree and asked for an ombudsman’s decision. In summary, he said he didn’t accept that HL’s communications about the WEIF were fair, clear and not misleading – and further said that there was “*no rational explanation for HL to include this fund on their wealth shortlist*” right up until its suspension in June 2019. He said that its inclusion on that list meant that it ranked on the shortlist above many other funds. He said it was reasonable for a private investor to believe that “*HL’s experts are spending thousands of hours*” crunching the numbers behind the fund before recommending it – and this simply could not be true of the WEIF.

Mr H said that HL had not complied with COBS 2.1.1R(1) as there was no logical explanation for why the fund remained on the list. Furthermore, he said there was no evidence of HL’s concerns, which it clearly had, being relayed to him – and instead it continued to recommend this fund ahead of many other “*more suitable ones*”. He said the investment he bought was not as described and was there mis-sold. He said there was “*serious questions to answer as to why this fund continued to be recommended*” and he didn’t feel those questions were answered by the investigator.

As agreement couldn’t be reached, the case was passed to me to decide.

What I’ve decided – and why

I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

I should start by saying that I understand and fully accept Mr H’s strength of feeling on his case, and the comments he has provided in response to the investigator’s assessment.

I've first set out what I consider the relevant regulatory obligations that HL's communications needed to meet.

What are the relevant regulatory obligations?

I think the following regulatory requirements are of particular relevance to my assessment of whether HL acted fairly and reasonably in its dealings in this case.

The Principles for Businesses, which are set out in the FCA's handbook "are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of firms under the regulatory system" (PRIN 1.1.2G). I consider that Principles 6 and 7 are of particular relevance to this complaint.

They say:

- Principle 6 – Customers' interests – A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.
- Principle 7 - Communications with clients – A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.

I have also taken into account the FCA rules for firms carrying on investment related business set out in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS). In particular, COBS 4.2.1R, which sets out the requirements on authorised firms, like HL, when communicating with clients. COBS 4.2.1R(1) says:

"A firm must ensure that a communication or a financial promotion is fair, clear and not misleading."

COBS 2.1.1R (1) (the client's best interests rule) is also relevant to this complaint. It says:

"A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client (the client's best interests rule)."

My findings

When making communications about the WEIF, whether through its Wealth Lists or other commentary, HL needed to ensure they were clear, fair and not misleading. This means that as long as HL's communications during the relevant period were factual and gave a balanced view of its assessment of the WEIF, then it didn't do anything wrong.

It's clear that HL provided significant positive commentary about Woodford and the WEIF when the fund was launched in 2014 and it obviously believed that Woodford's track record, as well as the objectives and performance of the WEIF between 2014 and 2016 were such that it continued to be a fund that it thought met its criteria for inclusion on its Wealth Lists.

The evidence I've seen shows that whilst HL met numerous times between 2014 and 2016 with Woodford and had frank conversations about his management of the fund, its views were largely consistent with what it was telling its customers. Whilst I accept that Mr H took what HL was telling him about the WEIF into account when he decided to first invest in the WEIF in 2015, the decision to invest was one that he was making for himself, without advice from HL. And it was therefore up to him to ensure that he was comfortable with the makeup of the WEIF, its objectives and its overall risk profile, whilst also taking into account what HL

was saying about the fund.

And so Mr H's decisions not to sell his holdings in the WEIF were also his to make.

In December 2016, HL said on its website that the WEIF was "*not a typical equity income fund*" and said that unlike most equity income funds which were exposed to large high-yielding companies, "*only around 50%*" of the WEIF was invested in this area. The remainder was "*invested in small and medium sized companies, or those not listed on the stock market*".

So I think it's fair to say that at this point in time, Mr H ought to have known that the WEIF had certain risks associated with its investment strategy.

HL was explicit that the fund had a "*significant bias to smaller companies relative to the FTSE All Share Index which adds risk, and also has more invested in medium sized companies than the index*". Ultimately HL's view was that this approach would "*add significant value for investors able to withstand the additional risk and volatility that comes from investing in smaller and unquoted companies.*"

In my view, this shows that in December 2016 HL was clearly outlining the additional risks associated with investing in the WEIF and describing the type of investor who should be investing in it. Mr H needed to consider this and decide for himself whether he was able to withstand the additional risk and, importantly, happy to take it.

And having reviewed the evidence of HL's meetings with WIM in 2016, I can see that in summary it was aware that the WEIF was no longer a typical equity income fund – in line with the commentary it gave to its customers.

I can also see that it knew there had been a shift towards small cap and growth stocks which it had not expected – and it recognised that in the event of significant outflows, that proportion would increase and potentially affect WIM's ability to invest further. HL was also aware that its customers might not know how the fund had changed – and it agreed to take steps to address this. It's clear to me that the update above was designed to draw these concerns to their customer's attention – in my view it did so clearly, fairly and not misleadingly.

But HL also continued to hold the view that the WEIF was still an investment that would add value for investors – and I'm satisfied it held that view internally and so it was clear, fair and not misleading to have continued to say that in its updates. It was obviously for Mr H to decide for himself whether the risks and the features of the WEIF which HL was describing to him were right for his circumstances.

I acknowledge that in 2017 the WEIF began to underperform its benchmark, but I'm satisfied that HL's continuing communications about the fund remained balanced. It was clear that it viewed the WEIF as a long-term investment and explained in its June 2017 update that Woodford had "*a long history of making big stock or sector bets, and while these decisions have at times taken time to come to fruition, they have added significant value for investors over the long term*".

In an article it published in September 2017 on its website, it explained that "*judging a fund manager over a time period of a few months is folly, especially one with such a long and distinguished track record*". This article explained that Woodford had experienced poor performance in the past, and that it was "*quite right to question any fund manager on their performance*" which HL said it had done. But it explained that his approach involved seeking out undervalued companies and this strategy had "*seen his investors well-rewarded over the*

long term".

In its November 2017 Wealth Report HL said that performance "*over the past year has been disappointing relative to the FTSE All Share Index*" and that some of Woodford's stock selections had under-performed. But HL continued to have "*faith in his abilities to deliver for investors*". In my view HL was entitled to continue to believe in the long-term prospects of the WEIF – and I'm not persuaded it was misleading for it to communicate its view that, over the long term, the WEIF would still be a good investment. I'm not persuaded that this belief, and its communication of it, was inconsistent with the obligations I've set out above.

In December 2017 HL said on its website that the WEIF wasn't "*a typical equity income fund*" and highlighted that around 9.5% of the fund was in unquoted companies. HL explained clearly that "*small and unquoted businesses are typically considered higher-risk because their shares are difficult to sell*". And it concluded that Woodford's approach would "*result in periods of poor performance*" but it was "*premature to write Neil Woodford off*".

In my view this update gave Mr H sufficient knowledge to decide for himself whether he was comfortable with the risks the WEIF represented and crucially, whether as an investment it remained consistent with his aims and objectives. Furthermore, the previous updates had clearly highlighted HL's concerns over the fund's performance – but also explained the reasons why it continued to believe that the fund remained a good investment. In my view, whilst Mr H was entitled to place some weight on the presence of the WEIF on HL's Wealth lists, he also needed to place weight on the actual commentary that HL was providing and the information he was being given, when deciding for himself whether to remain invested.

Furthermore, the key issue here is that none of these updates differed markedly from the concerns HL was expressing to Woodford throughout the year and from its internally held view that whilst the fund was suffering from a period of poor performance, HL remained of the view that over the long term the investment would come good.

The evidence shows that HL was aware of the WEIF nearing the 10% limit and was clearly aware of the poor performance of the fund. I've seen evidence that it robustly challenged WIM when necessary, but it was also reassured by WIM's responses to those concerns – in particular in relation to the levels of unquoted stock. Ultimately, HL continued to believe that periods of poor performance were temporary, and that whilst it was important to ensure it was open about the nature of the WEIF and how it had changed, it continued to believe it was a good investment for the long term.

It's clear to me that Mr H had sufficient information from these updates to know that the WEIF was not a typical equity investment – and that there were specific risks in the way the WEIF was managed that he needed to be comfortable with.

In that context, I don't agree the message that HL continued to believe the fund would improve its performance over the long term was misleading, because HL believed that to be the case – and was entitled to that reasonably held belief.

And I'm satisfied that HL's communications in 2018 and 2019 were equally clear, fair and not misleading. In March 2018, for example, HL published an update following WEIF's change of sector.

It clearly explained how almost "*40% of the fund is invested in small and mid-sized lower-yielding companies*" with "*an additional 10% invested in companies not yet listed on the stock market*". And the same update was clear that HL accepted Woodford's approach would "*lead to tough periods of performance*" but that it remained "*comfortable with the inclusion of unquoted companies*" although it did not "*want to see them increase as a*

proportion of the fund from here". It reminded investors to "*ensure they are comfortable with the investment approach and risks*".

In response to the view Mr H says that HL's concerns weren't relayed to him, but I'm satisfied the updates above, especially from 2017 onwards, show that HL was highlighting to investors like him the make-up of the fund and the risks associated with Woodford's approach. It clearly gave information about the risks of poor performance with Woodford's approach.

The evidence I've seen of HL's internal views and the meetings it had with WIM during 2018 show that HL was largely reassured that WIM had taken onboard its feedback, particularly in relation to continued investment in unquoted stock. And this is clearly reflected in the communication above. Internally it continued to believe that the fund would come good in the long term, but it acknowledged that it needed to ensure clients were aware of the nature of the fund, the need to diversify and the strategy WIM was following. In my view, the updates I've quoted above achieve this in a clear, fair and not misleading way.

In 2019 HL issued an update in January in which it explained its recent catch-up with Woodford. It said that although it had been a long-term supporter of Woodford, "*his funds have recently performed poorly*" and so it had been "*an uncomfortable time to hold the fund and our own conviction has been tested*". The update then went on to explain why it continued to keep the fund on its Wealth 50 and provided a detailed explanation of how the WEIF had changed since its launch, and some of the inherent risks of Woodford's approach to investing.

And it said it was clear that some of Woodford's investments hadn't "*paid off*" and importantly highlighted to investors "*the importance of having a diversified portfolio, spreading your investments amongst managers that invest differently*".

It concluded by saying that it was "*understandable that some investors are getting impatient with Woodford*" and that it had also "*been disappointed with recent performance*". But it said that its approach was to back proven managers for the long-term and "*as part of a diversified portfolio, we still think Woodford has a place*".

Crucially, it said:

"We could be wrong. If we are we'll put our hands up. It might be tempting to change our opinion now to be rid of the current discomfort, but we don't think it would be the right thing to do".

Further updates in March highlighted that Woodford was experiencing "*his worst spell of performance*" and the fact that HL had been urging Woodford to "*address the weighting [of unquoted] stocks in his portfolio*" – and overall it said that Woodford had "*shown an ability to make the big calls right, and when he does, investors profit*". I'm satisfied these updates were clearly relaying HL's concerns about the fund – and emphasised the sustained underperformance of the fund and that this was not in line with its expectations. In my view Mr H had sufficient information at this point to decide whether the risk of remaining invested in the WEIF was a risk he was willing to take.

During this period, the evidence shows that HL was in regular contact with Woodford in a bid to understand the challenges he was facing in managing the fund and to ensure that its faith in his ability to turn things around wasn't mis-placed. The suspension of three stocks on the Guernsey exchange was a significant cause for concern – but this suspension was only

temporary.

Furthermore, although it discussed whether the time had now come to remove the WEIF from its Wealth List, it's clear that internally it also considered the likelihood that the WEIF would recover. It had been reassured by WIM that it would deal with the level of unquoted stock in the portfolio – and HL told its clients this. I'm satisfied at this point, HL was clearly finding a way to balance communicating the risks and its concerns to consumers, while at the same time being open that it continued to believe that the WEIF would recover in the longer term.

When looking at the updates it provided, I think it's clear from HL's updates that there were risks in remaining invested in the WEIF, and the performance had now been disappointing for some time. But it was entitled to tell its clients that it believed the fund would recover – because that is what it believed internally at the time, for reasons which it gave in its updates.

Overall there were periods between 2016 and 2019 when HL raised concerns with Woodford, for example around the level of unquoted stock in the WEIF, but it explained these concerns in its public updates or Wealth Lists – at the same time, it held the view that whilst there were some concerns in the short term, over the long term the WEIF would end up being a good investment for its clients. HL was entitled to hold that view, and I've seen insufficient evidence that it came to that conclusion unreasonably, capriciously or in a way that was not genuinely based on its assessment of the WEIF and its future prospects.

Whilst I appreciate HL's view has turned out to be wrong, largely as a result of the liquidation of the fund which was not something it had anticipated, I don't consider that means its communications were not clear, fair and not misleading.

In my view it clearly explained the risks of the fund, the areas where it had concerns and the reasons why it thought it was still worthwhile to hold it as part of a diversified portfolio. It was then for individual investors to decide, for themselves, whether in light of that information, the risks as described as well as the ongoing period of under-performance, holding the WEIF remained suitable for them.

I acknowledge Mr H disagrees that the WEIF had a place on HL's Wealth lists – and I understand why. However the list themselves didn't make any guarantees about the performance of the investments they promoted and for the reasons I've given, I'm not persuaded the WEIF's inclusion on those lists was misleading.

Mr H has said that the WEIF was mis-sold to him, but I'm not persuaded it was. HL didn't advise Mr H or personally recommend the investment to him. It promoted the WEIF on its Wealth lists because it believed that, over the long term, the WEIF would generate positive returns for its customers. But it's important to highlight that HL wasn't managing the WEIF and had no say over what stocks Woodford was choosing to buy. It also was not responsible for the decision to suspend and subsequently liquidate the fund – this was the responsibility of the authorised corporate director of the fund and wasn't something HL had any say over. In the updates I've seen it acknowledged and highlighted the WEIF's period of under-performance, but I'm satisfied that it also continued to have reason to believe that the under-performance was temporary and eventually the WEIF's performance would improve. I'm satisfied it didn't mislead Mr H by telling him, through its commentary, that it believed this would be the case.

Furthermore, Mr H knew, from 2017 onwards, that the WEIF's performance had not been in line with HL's expectations – and I'm not persuaded the mere fact that the WEIF continued to be present on the Wealth list ought to have overridden the additional commentary that HL

actually provided on the fund, some of which I've set out above.

Ultimately, Mr H needed to decide for himself whether to remain invested in the WEIF. I appreciate my conclusions will be disappointing to Mr H and I understand why he feels HL ought to be responsible for the losses to his investments. But I'm satisfied that the financial loss he has experienced was not caused by something HL did or didn't do or because it misled him in anyway. I'm satisfied those losses were caused by the performance of the underlying investments in the WEIF and the initial suspension and subsequent liquidation of the fund clearly exacerbated those losses and prevented his ability to exit the fund.

For all these reasons, I don't uphold Mr H's complaint.

My final decision

My final decision is that I don't uphold Mr H's complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr H to accept or reject my decision before 12 September 2024.

Alessandro Pulzone
Ombudsman